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This study examines three key determinants of corporate governance change in Bulgaria: 
the Washington Consensus policy, primitive accumulation of capital forces, and ‘catching-up’ 
factors. The study reveals that in the early transition (1989-96) primitive capital accumulation 
prevailed over the Washington Consensus impact on corporate governance transformation while 
since 1997 Washington Consensus has been in the process of becoming the decisive factor for 
institutional change. The emerging corporate governance system has been neither Anglo-
American (market based) nor bank-based, but rather a ‘crony’ relationship-based one. The 
striking features of this system are as follows: (i) a dual enterprise sector, (ii) ownership 
heterogeneity; (iii) fragile capital markets; (iv) pervasive banks lending behavior; (v) 
globalization factors discretion. The challenge to policy-makers in Bulgaria is how to design 
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I. Introduction    
  1 
In the 1990s, a policy approach known as the Washington Consensus gave rise to mediocre results 
in countries like Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovak Republic, Russia, other former Soviet 
Union states, and mixed results in all the European post-communist countries (Table 1).
1 The transition 
recession observed was comparable to the Great Depression, and for most of the transition countries it was 
even much worse. In 2000, real GDP was below its level at the beginning of transition for most of the 
countries.
2 
In the early 1990s, according to the Washington Consensus policy, the basic corporate governance 
issues in transition were: (i) separation of ownership and control between small shareholders and top 
managers; (ii) the inefficient role of the state both as owner of public enterprises and as regulator of 
economic activities; (iii) inefficient socialist state ownership and ‘totalitarian’ state. This ‘conventional 
wisdom’ was mainly based on the Anglo-American contemporary theory and practice (refer to Bearle and 
Means’s seminal book published in 1932) and neo-conservative tendencies in the U.S. and the U.K. in the 
1980s, regarding the economic role of the state and the communist economic system itself.  
Respectively, the main remedies for the poor enterprise performance in transition economies were: 
(i) introduction of the entrepreneurial spirit of capitalism through establishment of new private firms; (ii) 
reduction of the role of the state through privatisation and deregulation; (iii) establishment of more efficient 
ownership and control structures based on concentrated ownership, outsiders control and foreign investors 
participation (Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1993; EBRD, 1995; World Bank, 1996). However, at the end of 
the decade, these ‘good ideas’ were to be reconsidered.  
First, there is a wealth of literature on the effects of ownership and control structures on firm 
performance in transition economies. However, the results of empirical studies are mixed concerning any 
significant difference in performance of state and privatised firms. (See for a survey of the literature, Nellis 
(1999),  Bevan et all (1999).  
Second, many studies support the hypotheses that newly established  private firms are more 
efficient than both state and privatised firms (for a survey, see Bilsen and Konnings, 1998). However, these 
studies using the conventional state-private firms dichotomy cannot explain the basic difference between 
newly established ‘crony’ private firms, on the one hand, and independent private firms, on the other hand. 
There is no simple correlation between private sector share and either national economic performance or 
progress in transition (S.Estrin, 2001).  
Third, there is also no significant evidence that insiders-controlled firms underperform outsiders-
controlled firms. (Among recent studies, see Jones and Mygind (1999) for the Baltic States, Peev et al. 
(1999) for Bulgaria, Romania and Albania, Djankov (1999) for Georgia and Moldova).  
Fourth, contrary to the Washington Consensus expectations in the early transition, when ‘insiders’ 
and ‘the state’ were described as key enemies of the economic reform, typical outcomes of this policy in 
many countries were backstairs ‘outsiders’ control by interest groups and weak state (Olson, 1995; see also, 
Koford (2000) for the Bulgarian case).  
Fifth, attempts for a deeper understanding of evolving  ownership structures and output  in 
transition are based on studies of the U-shape of industrial output. A number of papers explain the decline 
in output with supply side distortions, as disorganization in historical links of production (Blanchard, 1997), 
labour market frictions (Atkeson and Kehoe (1996), credit constraints Marin and Schnitzer, 1999), and 
demand shocks (Repkin and Walsh, 1999). In Bulgaria, for instance, after the fall in GDP during 1990-93 
(1991:  -11.7%, 1992:  -7.3%, 1993:  -1.5%), there followed a recovery in 1994-95 (1994:  +1.8%, 1995:  
+2.1%). However, the optimistic visions about 1996 and the following years proved unrealistic (EBRD, 
1995). In 1996, GDP fell sharply by 10.9%. A similar, second sharp fall in GDP since the beginning of the 
transition was also observed in Romania, Albania, and less so in the Czech Republic. The optimistic 
theoretical expectations underestimated fundamental reasons for further instability that were still existing 
and worsening, namely the emerging “crony” relationship-based corporate governance system.  
                                                 
1 For a recent overview of transition countries (under)development, see World Bank (2002).    
2 For strong critical views regarding the Washington Consensus policy, see Gore (2001) on its methodological failures; 
Kornai (2001) on transition countries; Taylor (1992) on developing countries; and Cross and Strachan (2001) focusing 
on its theoretical framework failures; for moderate critical views, see for example, Stiglitz (1998); Srinivasan, (2000); 
and for ‘left’- based critique, see for example, Panitch,2000.  
 
  2The purpose of this paper is to examine the specific factors determining corporate governance 
change in transition and outline the key features of ownership, control and governance transformation. The 
paper focuses on the corporate governance transformation in Bulgaria, but by extension the results can 
explain post-communist corporate governance design in general. The study reveals that in the early 
transition (1989-96) primitive capital accumulation prevailed over the Washington Consensus impact on 
corporate governance change while since 1997 Washington Consensus has been in the process of becoming 
the decisive factor for this transformation. The emerging corporate governance system in Bulgaria has been 
neither Anglo-American (market-based) nor bank-based. The policy outcome has been rather a ‘crony’ 
relationship-based corporate governance system. The striking features of this system are as follows: (i) a 
dual enterprise sector, (ii) ownership heterogeneity; (iii) fragile capital markets; (iv) pervasive banks 
lending behaviour; (v) globalisation factors discretion. 
Section 2 presents the framework of the study focusing on key factors for corporate governance 
change in post-communist countries: globalisation, post-communist primitive accumulation of capital, and 
‘catching-up’ accumulation of capital. Section 3 discusses corporate governance transformation in Bulgaria 
in the 1990s. Section 4 briefly analyses historical experience of developed market economies and corporate 
governance design in Bulgaria. Section 5 focuses on the ‘catching-up’ stage of development and corporate 
governance change in Bulgaria. Section 6 analyses Washington Consensus policy failures in the field of 
corporate governance.  Section 7 concludes.  
 
II. Framework of Study: Globalisation, Transition, “Catching-Up” and Corporate Governance 
Change 
 
The fundamental unanswered question of the Bulgarian economic policy during transition has 
been which kind of corporate governance and corporate finance system has to be developed under the 
Bulgarian conditions – a ‘bank-based’ system (like Germany and Japan), a ‘market-based’ (the Anglo-
American model), an ‘implicit rules-based’ (like Italy), a ‘mixture of a capital market-based system and a 
bank-based system’(Dutch case) or a unique ‘Bulgarian’ system.
3  This theme leads to the big issue of the 
methods of studying separation of ownership from control in post-communist countries.  
Corporate governance can be defined as the design of institutions that constrain potential 
managerial opportunism and discretionary behaviour, and compel managers to pursue strategies that are in 
shareholders’ (stakeholders’) best interests.
4  In the post-communist transition context, it includes design of 
property-rights transformation (corporatization, privatisation, new private firms establishment), legal, 
regulatory and institutional framework for business activities (especially, capital markets, a bank sector). 
Two basic approaches to studying these issues can be outlined. First, the conventional approach to 
separation of ownership and control, stressing (i) different elements of the corporate governance system, e.g. 
managerial ownership, board of directors, CEO compensations, etc. (internal ones), and market for 
corporate control, capital and managerial labour markets, etc. (external ones); (ii) ownership structures and 
types of control and their impact on firm performance and discretionary managerial behaviour (for a 
summary of literature, see Peev, 1995). This approach is based on a narrow understanding of both corporate 
governance issues in general and agency issues between top-managers and small shareholders in particular.  
The second approach is partly based on some recent developments, like some unsuccessful post-
privatisation stories in many transition countries in the 1990s (for a survey, see Nellis,1999), a weak state 
and ‘state capture’ observed (EBRD,1999), financial crises in some transitional economies, e.g. Russia in 
1998 (Black et all, 1999), Bulgaria in 1996 (Koford, 2000), convergence trends in the Continental Europe 
and Japan to Anglo-American models in the 1990s, and the East-Asian crisis in 1997. Recent studies on 
corporate governance in different countries concluded that a concentrated ownership rather than a dispersed 
one is a more typical feature of the finance systems of countries outside the Anglo-American world (see La 
Porta  et all, 1998). Expropriation of small shareholders has been observed in both developed and 
                                                 
3 For a discussion about the financial system choice at early transition, see McKinnon (1991); Szego (1993); see also, 
Hermes and Lensink (2000) for survey of discussions on the financial system in Eastern Europe; for description of 
basic issues of the modern financial system, see Thakor (1996), Allen and Gale (2000)  and see also, Odagiri (1992) for 
management and competition aspects of corporate governance; Dietl (1998) for a comparison of neoclassical and 
relational financial regulations.  
4 Some recent studies focus on the welfare of stakeholders (employees, suppliers, costumers, creditors, etc.), see, for 
example, Tirole (2000). 
  3developing countries (especially after the East Asian crisis) and key agency issues have been reconsidered 
focusing also on large and small shareholders relationships, and ‘crony’ business links. Capital markets 
have been seen as a more efficient information device and in many European countries, processes of 
convergence to Anglo-American models have began ( Coffee, 2000).  
This broader approach is focused on (i) legal and regulatory framework of the corporate 
governance system, law enforcement, security of property and creditor rights (for transition economies, see 
Berglof and Thadden, 1999; for general analysis, see La Porta, et all, (1997,98,99); company stakeholders 
(for transition economies in general, see Mygind, 1999; see also Buck et all, 1998 (applying stakeholder-
agency theory) and Fox and Heller, 1999 (applying transaction costs economics) on Russia; for property-
rights approach, see Alchian and Demsetz, 1972); (ii) economic environment dimensions of corporate 
governance, especially country governance, corruption, ‘crony’ relations, ‘captor’ relations between firms 
and state, shadow economy, (see, for example articles at the World Bank site: 
www.worldbank.org/research/governance/corruption); see also, the bulk of articles on ‘crony’ capitalism 
after the East Asian crisis (for example, Rajan and Zingales, 1999).   
In transition economies the conventional approach to corporate governance structures and their 
effects on performance encounters some difficulties in explaining the real business behaviour. Regarding 
Bulgaria, empirical studies have revealed that ownership concentration or dispersion, insiders or outsiders 
types of control, establishment of boards of directors and other governance mechanisms, or their absence, 
are not a reliable institutional basis for forecasts of business behaviour in the specific transitional 
environment (Peev, 2001).  
This study has applied the second broader approach on corporate governance issues in post-
communist transition. The subject of study is (i) ownership and control structures transformation, capital 
markets emergence and banking sector transformation in Bulgaria during 1989-2001; (ii) factors for the 
corporate governance change observed. The analysis is built on findings of author’s empirical studies of 
corporatization and privatisation in the Bulgarian economy.
5 It also has applied results of some recent 
critical studies about (i) the Washington Consensus policy in post-communist countries (described in the 
previous section); (ii) studies on ‘state capture’ (see, Hellman et all, 2000) and studies on primitive 
accumulation of capital (after Kornai’s notion about vulgar Marxism and vulgar Coase-ism (Kornai, 2001), 
see, for example, Marx’s Capital, vol. I, ch.7); (iii) studies on political economy of corporate governance 
evolution (historical development of corporate governance (see, for example, Coffee, 2000); institutional 
change of property-rights (Wiesner, 2001); (iv) studies on ‘catching-up’ and corporate governance in 
transition (Morck and Yeung, 2001); etc. The study has also applied some recent findings about specific 
coalitions for collective actions in transition (see, Wedel (2001) for Russia; see also, the excellent latest 
book by Olson (2000) for a more general discussion).  
   The key hypothesis is that the basic factors practically shaping corporate governance design in 
post-communist countries in the 1990s were as follows: globalisation (the Washington Consensus policy, 
convergence to Anglo-American models, the EU enlargement), transition (post-communist primitive 
accumulation of capital, law voluntarism, post-communist informal rules), catching-up factors (transfer of 
knowledge about historical experience of developed market economies in the field of corporate governance, 
the catching-up stage of development of the particular country, the ‘catching-up’ accumulation of capital, 
etc.). The logic of corporate governance transformation in different transition countries can be seen in the 
specific power distribution among foreign actors (like the IMF), emerging international coalitions for 
collective action, coalitions for primitive accumulation of capital and capital flight, coalitions for catching-
up accumulation of capital and national development.  
   The detailed investigation of all the factors described above is beyond the scope of this study. It 
focuses mainly on (i) the Washington Consensus policy; (ii) post-communist primitive accumulation of 
capital; (iii) the historical experience of developed market economies in the field of corporate governance; 
(iv) ‘catching-up’ accumulation of capital.  
    
A. Globalisation and Corporate Governance 
 
                                                 
5  For empirical study of ownership and control transformation in Bulgaria, see Peev (1995), Peev and Hare (1995) on 
corporatization; Peev et all (1999), Peev and Simmons (2000) on privatized and newly established private firms; see 
also for a brief summary, Peev (2001). 
  4The Washington Consensus policy has been the dominant approach to development since the early 
1980s.
6  This approach was initially adapted to developing countries and since communism collapse it 
became ‘conventional wisdom’ to policy reform in transition countries (see World Bank, 1991; 1996; 
EBRD, 1995). This approach is characterized by focusing the government attention on three main domains: 
(i) privatisation and deregulation, (ii) macrostabilization by low inflation and fiscal deficits, (iii) 
liberalization through opening of economy to the rest of the world, and a domestic prices control release. 
This is a top-down approach, driven by the IMF and the World Bank stabilization and structural adjustment 
policies and loans conditionality and based on the leading role of foreign advisers. The underlying idea of 
Washington Consensus policies is a shift from state-led policies to market-oriented ones. This has reflected 
some neo-conservative tendencies in the US and the UK in the early 80s but has also served the transition 
“from plan to market” in the 90s. The specific policy prescriptions are presented below (see for a detailed 
analysis Gore, 1996; Taylor, 1992).  
First, the national government has to have a circumscribed role and norms of liberal international 
economic order like free markets, private ownership and private owner’s incentives could play a decisive 
role. Countries adapting their policies to these norms would receive better outcomes measured by GDP 
growth and other country performance indicators. According to this policy, the national interest is 
identified by increasing economic growth and personal income welfare but such development issues, as 
national unity, national identification and sovereignty are not important. Countries trying to carry out 
policies conflicting with liberal international norms, such as an active industrial policy protecting selected 
industries, have been shown as examples of governments acting against their national interests. Domestic 
policy-makers have been selected for potential leaders on the narrow base of their loyalty to the 
Washington Consensus policy tenets (for the case of Russia, see Wedel, 2001). Second, the normative 
frame of reference of the policy described above was international, global, but its explanatory frame was 
local, national. Thus, the methodological approach to transition countries can be described as 
“methodological nationalism” (Gore, 1996). Factors contributing to the national (under) development are 
divided into internal (national) and external (international), the national factors being described as the most 
important to explain the economic situation in a particular country. The country performance (the basic 
subject of study) is attributed mainly to the domestic policy (World Bank, 1997). In fact, the official slogan 
of “transition to a free market economy” serves globalisation norms. However, according to the 
Washington Consensus policy approach, globalisation factors are “external” and not on the research agenda, 
and only domestic (internal) factors are decisive for the country performance. Third, a salient feature of this 
approach is the excluding of such issues as capital accumulation and human capital development from the 
policy agenda of transition.  
Some key features of the ownership and control design in transition based on the Washington 
Consensus approach are as follows. First, investor relations. The main assumption is that the origin of 
capital of new investors was not significant (no specific disclosure rules were required). Enterprise 
property-rights transformation is based on two key tools: a) ‘corporatisation‘(establishment of companies 
with a hundred percent state participation) and b) increasing the share of the private sector in the economy 
through privatisation of former socialist state-owned firms and entry of newly established private firms. 
(During 1990-99, about three quarters of the U.S. aid to Central and Eastern European countries fell under 
economic restructuring, including privatisation and private sector development. This was also a priority of 
the EU assistance to Central and Eastern Europe (Wedel, 2001).     
Second, ownership structures. It is taken for axiom that new private owners would be firm value-
maximizers. The main hypothesis is that state-owned firms would perform less efficiently than private firms 
(property-rights hypothesis). The foremost task is rapid liquidation of the state sector through accelerated 
privatisation. The expectations are that privatisation will automatically harden the budget constraints 
(Kornai, 2000). Four basic types of firms by ownership structure are observed in transition conditions: 
traditional state-owned enterprises (SOE) and corporatized state-owned enterprises (CE) in the state sector, 
privatised enterprises (PRE) and private enterprises established de novo (POE) in the private sector. The 
basic assumptions are that state firms (SOE and CE) would be less efficient than privatised firms (PRE), 
and privatised firms would be less efficient than private firms established de novo (POE). In fact, the 
number of the privatised firms served as a key indicator for reform development in a given country. 
According to the fulfilment of the ‘plan’ for privatisation, a transition country could receive further aid or 
face reduction. (For example, with regard to U.S. assistance to transition countries, foreign consultants 
                                                 
6 For the term ‘Washington Consensus’, see articles by the term inventor John Williamson ( 1990, 1993, 2000).  
  5were sent to the country’s bodies for privatisation to accelerate the privatisation process (for the case of 
Russia, Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, see Wedel, 2001).         
Third, control types. The main hypothesis about control types in the private sector is that interests 
of managers and owners diverge and management-controlled firms would be less efficient than owner-
controlled firms (Berle-Means thesis). In the transition economies, the dichotomy of insiders-controlled and 
outsiders-controlled firms is used as a basic distinction. In the group of insiders, managers-controlled and 
workers-controlled firms are observed. In the outsiders-controlled group - domestic investor controlled-
firms and firms under foreign investor control.  Basic assumptions about firm performance by control types 
are that insiders-controlled firms would be less efficient than outsiders-controlled firms, workers-controlled 
firms would be less efficient than managers-controlled firms, and domestic investor-controlled firms would 
be less efficient than foreign investor-controlled firms (see, for example, EBRD,1995).  
Fourth, governance mechanisms. Assumptions regarding the emerging governance mechanisms 
are as follows. New private owners with their inherent private ownership motivation would create new 
market-oriented implicit rules of the game. New private owners would have discretion to establish efficient 
internal governance structures (board of directors, CEO compensations, managerial ownership). External 
mechanisms (managerial labour markets, capital markets, market for corporate control) would be 
inefficient in the early transition and would be developed gradually. Bank control would be established by 
the emergence of many banks in order to compete with one another in corporate finance. Government 
control must be passive. A withdrawal of the state from state-owned companies would be necessary, as 
well as establishing of board of directors’ institution in corporatized companies with a hundred percent 
state participation.  
 
B. Historical Experience of Developed Countries and Corporate Governance Design 
 
The Washington Consensus policy to transition economies was also stimulated by some trends to 
convergence with Anglo-American models in the 1990s. However, in post-communist countries, where the 
system transformation is the most important characteristic, the historical approach to corporate governance 
evolution is more reliable than adherence to some contemporary tendencies. The historical experience of 
developed countries, like U.S. in the last quarter of the 19
th century and the Japanese pre-war and post-war 
transformation, can suggest better starting points for corporate governance design in transition economies 
(see, for example, Herman (1981) for evolution of separation of ownership and control in the US in 1990-
74; for some recent studies, see Coffee (2000) for corporate governance genesis in the U.K. and the U.S.; 
see Okazaki (1999); Odagiri and Goto (1996); Kitamura et all (2001) for the Japanese historical 
experience; Nishimura (1999) for the impact of  initial conditions in transition economies).  
 
C. Post-communist Primitive Accumulation of Capital and Corporate Governance 
 
The above described Washington Consensus approach to corporate governance in transition 
countries is rooted in the basic assumptions of the general policy frame explaining the transition process 
itself: (i) Bearle-Means thesis about separation of ownership and control is relevant in transition as could be 
in any market economy, (ii) a law reform would trigger efficient corporate governance, (iii) transition is an 
ordinary economic process, (iv) private owners in transition countries would behave like owners in any 
developed market economy (see, for example, EBRD Transition Report,1995; World Bank Report, 1996). 
This frame can explain why such issues as the genesis of the transition process, the driving forces staying 
beyond it, globalisation factors in the 90s, were not found on the corporate governance research agenda, at 
least before the Russian financial crisis in 1998.  
The origin of capital matters. When Bearle and Means wrote their seminal book on separation of 
ownership and control in the modern American corporation in 1932, they had taken for granted that 
somebody (saver, potential investor) had collected money through some means. The sources of this 
potential capital were not an issue to be studied.
7 Traditionally, corporate governance literature makes a 
difference between different sources of corporate finance like equity and debt financing (see for example, 
Jensen and Meakling, 1976 ). However, using the same traditional approach to corporate governance and 
finance in post-communist countries is fruitless. The origin of private capital does matter in a transition 
environment. In developed market economies, private investors and companies have had a long term of 
                                                 
7 Problems of the so-called “primitive accumulation of capital” are usually studied by Marxists.  
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created. The magical word “privatisation” cannot explain how domestic (not foreign) private capital could 
be collected. For example, in the U.S. at the last quarter of 19
th century, when the American corporate 
governance system was established, a chain connecting issuers and capital seekers (mainly railways at that 
time), financial intermediaries (investment bankers like Morgan) and investors (mainly foreign ones) 
determined the real economic structure staying behind corporate governance design.   According to the 
Washington Consensus approach to corporate governance design in transition countries, this chain could be 
imitated by state-owned firms that have to be privatised as capital seekers, the state (agency for 
privatisation) as the intermediary, and investors (mainly foreign ones). But this remains only an imitation. 
In transition countries, the real economic structure had quite a different form. The real seekers for capital 
were not state-owned firms but rather emerging private firms and the crucial question was where finance 
could come from. In transition countries, two basic sources of “primitive” post-communist accumulation of 
private capital can be outlined: foreign (private debt and equity, government external debt, foreign aid) and 
domestic ones (state budget, state-owned banks and firms). However, the financial intermediary role has 
been served not by investment bankers but rather by the state institutions. In the early transition, corporate 
governance was designed by political class to transfer capital mainly from state sources to private hands 
(for the case of Bulgaria, see OECD,97; 99; Koford, 2001.) This process was described by specific terms 
like assets stripping, looting, tunnelling (for the Czech case), prixvatizazija (for privatisation in Russia), 
spontaneous privatisation (in Hungary), collusion privatisation or mass fraud (for mass privatisation) and 
hijackers-swindlers privatisation (for MEBO schemes in Bulgaria). In many cases, the term “privatisation” 
has been misleading because it explains only the primitive accumulation of capital. Theoretically, this is a 
process of accumulation of capital that is not based on production and profit distribution, but rather on 
wealth redistribution through outright theft, war, revolution, etc. But if the process of primitive 
accumulation of capital was natural and typical of all the capitalist nations at their early stages of 
development (according to Marx) this process per se  cannot lead to such disastrous effects like the ones in 
Russia and other transition countries.    
Law voluntarism and capital flight. Another important feature of the transition process is that the 
policy was based on the belief that laws can be efficiently transplanted from developed economies into 
transition ones. In the early transition years, attempts to introduce market-based legislation produced 
unexpected specific results. High corruption, weak legislation protecting investors and weak law 
enforcement have been basic features of legal environment in many transition countries. Lack of property 
rights security for both small and large shareholders, and private business in general, and danger from 
expropriation after the primitive accumulation of capital (by ex-communists or other forces) have been 
some of the reasons for capital flight.   
Post-communist informal rules matter. In transition countries, the lack of dictator with 
encompassing interests (as under the communist regime) and the lack of an established democracy (as in 
Western societies) create a vacuum where the specific post-communist institutional conditions have a 
tremendous impact on economic reform (Olson, 2000).
8 In different countries, different attitudes to Russia 
and the former USSR, different degrees of nationalism, alienation from the state, state ownership and the 
home country determine the specific spirit of patriotism, business ethics, corporate culture, and attitudes to 
the transition in general.     
 
D. ‘Catching-Up’ Stage of Development and Corporate Governance 
 
The basic slogan and official goal of the Washington Consensus has been ‘transition to a market 
economy’. However, markets exist everywhere and ‘market economy’ per se cannot explain development 
differences among nations (Olson, 2000). In fact, at the start of the transition many transition economies 
were at a stage requiring to ‘catch-up’ with other advanced EU market economies. ‘Catching-up’ should 
have been the real objective of economic reforms. This is a specific stage when the economy has a potential 
to grow applying existing technological, marketing, and managerial knowledge from other developed 
economies (see, for example, for the case of Japan, Odagiri and Goto (1996); Sumiya et all (2000); Komiya 
et all (1988). For catch-up growth the most important constraint is the availability of capital. Access to 
                                                 
8 I follow the idea that institutions like informal rules, beliefs, social norms  are important factors (sometimes more 
important than law) for explaining economic behavior (see, for example, Milhaupt (2001) for the case of Japan; see 
Hart (2001) for integrating norms into the theory of the firm; see also Coffee (2001) for a more general discussion.  
  7cheap capital in order to absorb knowledge from outside the country is crucial and the institutions 
accumulating savings and providing finance for business are of a great importance. At this stage, ownership 
and control structures and corporate governance mechanisms play a minor role (Morck and Yeung, 2001). 
The experience of developed countries shows that quite different institutions in different countries can 
emerge in order to accumulate capital supporting the catch-up growth. For example, Japan and other East 
Asian countries have developed concentrated banking systems and active government industrial policies.  
 
E. Coalitions for Collective Actions 
 
Social engineering. The transition to a market economy in 1989 is not an ordinary economic 
transformation, based on Hayek’s spontaneous order notion. The irony for the champions of the 
transplantation of liberalism is that this transition resembles the process of ‘the building of communism’ 
after the World War II. The transition is a process of social engineering where a small group of people (top 
communist party-state nomenklatura, secret services, managers of large state-owned firms) decided 
(probably in 1985-89) to transform their political power into an economic one using market economy 
ideological slogans, the alienation of population from the communist reality and the support of 
globalisation factors (growing national external debt, capital export, establishment of companies abroad).
9 
However, these driving forces of the so-called “transition” were not the entrepreneurial and business part 
of society but the parasitic circles of the communist regime. The disproportionate power for collective 
action of these small groups with narrow parasitic interests is an ‘internal contradiction’ in the societies in 
transition from communism to democracy (Olson, 2000).    
Internationalist coalitions for collective actions. Bearle and Means never doubted national 
orientated utility functions of managers in the modern American corporations. National development-
oriented or antinational-oriented behaviour of both managers and shareholders was never seen as an 
important issue in corporate governance debate in developed countries which practical experience has been 
seen as an example what ought to be followed in transition economies. In developed market economies, 
national interest adherence of company owners and managers has been taken for granted. However, in 
transition countries, emergence of internationalist coalitions for collective actions with culture, attitudes 
and goals shaped partly by both the former communist internationalism legacy and the present new 
globalisation trends challenges our understanding of the dichotomy “national - global”. Without studying 
these internationalist economic agents we cannot analyse such basic transition facts as the rent-seeking 
behaviour of the ruling class and its important motivational characteristics – the maximization of capital 
flight, typical phenomenon in the early transition. However, to identify these specific international 
coalitions for collective action is a difficult task. These “flex” organizations were sometimes private, 
sometimes state, sometimes pro-Western, sometimes pro-national (see, for the case of Russia, for example, 
Wedel, 2001). In transition countries, international and global values have shaped the corporate culture of 
new private owners. For these private owners the rational behaviour  includes ‘investing’ in politicians and 
parties, ‘buying’ laws and influencing law enforcement (in short, capturing the state), benefiting from 
privatisation deals, government debt markets and capital markets deals, etc. Like the term ‘privatisation’, 
another misleading term “corruption” has been applied for these phenomena but in recent years a more 
adequate term has emerged – ‘state capture’ (Hellman et al. (2000); Hellman and Schankerman (2000).  
 
III. Transition to a Market Economy and Emerging Corporate Governance in Bulgaria in the 1990s 
 
Transition to a market economy in Bulgaria: some background information 
The Bulgarian transition to a market economy in the 1990s can be divided into two periods: the 
first is from the end of 1989 till the financial crisis of 1996-1997; the second one - after the introduction of 
a currency board in July 1997 to the present. First, the essential initial conditions at the beginning of 
transition were shocks from the collapse of the CMEA market and the foreign debt (12 billions of USD in 
1990) inherited from the former communist regime. The transition policy was based on the Washington 
Consensus. A price liberalization started in February 1991 and at the end of this year the inflation reached 
474%  (Table 2). The privatisation process was moving slowly because of fighting for control in 
                                                 
9 How complex and contradictory transition process has been can be seen, for example, in recent critical analyses of the 
CIA estimations of former USSR performance (see, for example, Becker, 1994). For “insiders” analysis, see also 
Solzenytzin (1999); Vladimir Bukovski (1998). 
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The financial stabilization was fragile. Both state-owned and newly established private banks issued non-
performing loans due to ‘crony’ relations. The central bank utilized its monetary policy for refinancing of 
commercial banks and for rescuing  the ‘crony’ banks from collapse. The evolution of the GDP during 
1990 - 95 corresponds the hypothesis of the U-shaped response of output to transformation shocks
10. 
However, the optimistic forecasts about 1996 and the following years were unrealistic
11.  There was an 
underestimation of the emerging ‘crony’ relationship based corporate governance that led to the outbreak of 
the financial crisis in 1996.  
Second, in 1996 the Bulgarian GDP sharply fell by 10.9%.  In July 1997 a currency board was 
introduced as a mechanism of recovering from the financial collapse. In 1997 the fall in GDP was 6.9% and 
in the next years there was GDP growth (3,5 % in 1998, 2,4% in 1999). The total amount of foreign direct 
investments was only USD 2 517 million (accumulated between 1992 and 1999). The share of the private 
sector in the GDP was about 70 percent of GDP in 2000 (BNB, 2000). During the currency board 
arrangement, a financial stabilization was established, inflation was low ( 1% - in 1998, and 0,4% in 1999) 
and the banking system was stable. However, the legacy of the wasted years remains. Despite the great 
expectations, the Bulgarian economy ten years later (like at the beginning of transition) has been at a stage 
requiring to ‘catch-up’ with other advanced EU market economies (Table 3).  
Some basic stages of the Bulgarian transition are presented in Table 4. The logic of the economic 
transformation can be partly seen in the specific power distribution among emerging coalitions for national 
development, globalisation factors, incl. Washington Consensus institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, 
etc., EU institutions (out of the scope of this analysis), the emerging communist-capitalist web and its 
international partners like the Russian interest groups, oligarchs, etc. (not in our analysis either). Some of 
these stages can be outlined as follows: 
 
(i)  1985-89, this is a pre-transition period when a huge foreign debt was accumulated and hidden 
privatisation has began; the gross foreign debt increased from USD 2.9 billion in 1984 to 
USD 10.7 billion in 1989 (ESE,1993); 
(ii)  1989-91, this is a period of default on the foreign debt (March 1990), corporatization of state-
owned enterprises, establishment of new private firms and hidden illegal privatisation of firms 
and banks;  
(iii)  1992-94, laws on privatisation, banks and credit activity were adopted, but the legal 
privatisation was slow and maximization of primitive accumulation of capital was the actual 
priority of ‘transition’;  
(iv)  1995-96, Bulgaria resumed its foreign debt service, maximization of both primitive 
accumulation of capital and foreign debt service turned out to be an unachievable task, and as 
a result the country was hit by a devastating financial crisis in 1996;  
(v)  1996-97, there was a radical change of transition priorities, the foremost task became the 
foreign debt service, for this goal a currency board was introduced; mass privatisation was 
carried out;  
(vi)  1997-99, there was rapid privatisation, management-employee buy-outs were prevailing; the 
foremost maximization of the foreign debt service continued; 
(vii)   2000-01, this was a period of the start of accession talks with the EU, and as a result Bulgaria 
significantly reformed its commercial legal framework but the government paid lip-services to 
the fight against corruption and state capture; 
(viii)  2001- a new coalition, oriented to the national development, took power (Prime Minister the 
former Bulgarian King Simeon II) and has increased great opposing expectations: (a) 
optimistic - about a new national policy for ‘catching-up’ with a radical change in policy 
priorities (entrepreneurs, population); (b) pessimistic - about a hidden restoration of the 
retrograde regime prior 1997 (former state captors). What tendencies will prevail is a crucial 
issue for the further development.   
 
The corporate governance change in Bulgaria is analysed as follows: an overview of property-rights 
transformation (point A); the property-rights change in 1989-1996 (point B); the property-rights change in 
                                                 
10 For more discussion, Blanchard O., The Economics of Post-Communist Transition, 1997. 
11 See for example the optimistic forecasts of the Annual Transition Report 1995, EBRD. 
  91997-2001 (point C); a summary of emerging ownership and control structures (point D); capital markets 
emergence (point E); banking sector transformation (point F).  
 
A. Privatisation and Newly Private Firms Establishment: Overview 
 
1. Private sector development 
The main factor contributing to the development of the private sector in Bulgaria during 1990-96 
was the creation of new private enterprises. The share of privatised state-owned enterprises was 
insignificant (Table 5). Privatisation has made a little progress and it has been applied mainly to small and 
medium-sized enterprises. Only 2,396 enterprises have been privatised for the whole period (1992-96), the 
major part of them is municipal property or parts of enterprises. Substantial progress in privatisation was 
observed in 1997-98 connected with the finalization of a number of large-scale deals as well as the 
completion of the mass privatisation. About 1,050 enterprises were privatised - entirely or part of them - 
through vouchers. In the period 1992-97 about 20% of total enterprise assets were privatised. In 1997 there 
was acceleration of this process, e.g. about 4% of assets were privatised through cash sales with proceeds 
of USD 421,4 million. However, the data for 1998 show only 155,8 million USD privatisation proceeds. 
The main reason for slow progress is the continuing fight for corporate control between different groups of 
interests and between different ‘crony firms’. By the end of 1999, the private sector accounted for nearly 
65,3 % of value added in the whole economy, i.e. 98 % in agriculture and forestry, 53,3 % in industry. In 
2000, the private sector accounted for 69,3 % of value added in the Bulgarian economy showing a steady 
growth during last years. 
The total percentage of the privatised assets since the beginning of privatisation process on 1 
January 1993 till the end of 2001 is 52.5%, which is about 80% of the state assets due to be privatised in 
the mid-term. Between 1 January 1993 and 31 December 2001 the total privatisation effect was 10,777.268 
Bulgarian Lev (1 Lev = 1 DEM). The distribution of concluded transactions by sectors is as follows: 
industry - 32,6%, trade - 23,1%, agriculture - 12,4%, tourism - 10,7%, others - 21,2%. Privatisation of the 
basic part of the companies in manufacturing has finished. Some of the big privatised companies are: 
“Balkan Airlines”, “Neftochim”, “Petrol”, “Agropolichim”, “Himko”, “Antibiotic” - Razgrad, “Yambolen”, 
“OtK” - Kardjali, “Kremikovtsi”, “Promet” - Burgas, “Asarel-Medet”, “DZU”” - Stara Zagora, “Alumina”, 
“Arsenal”, “Beta-Cherven Bryag”. Energy utilities privatisation has barely started. The privatisation 
process of the Telecommunication Company is ongoing. In the financial sector, the United Bulgarian Bank 
(July 1997) and the Bulgarian Post Bank (the end of 1998) have been privatised. In 1999, Society General 
bought TB Express and Reagent Pacific - Hebros Bank. In 2000, Bulbank was privatised. 
 
2. Public sector decline 
 
The main changes in state-owned enterprises are related to their transformation 
(corporatization). This was a process transforming former state enterprises into companies with 100% 
state participation.  In general, this process has taken place mainly in the 1991-92 and has developed at a 
considerably lower pace in the following years. After 1993, non-transformed state-owned and municipal 
firms decreased twice in number. This was due to two main reasons: first, the continuing process of 
corporatization and, second, the privatisation of non-transformed state-owned enterprises. As a result of 
the progress made in privatisation and enterprise restructuring, the non-private sector has decreased its 
share to 34,7 % of gross value added in 1999. Respectively, the share of public sector in industrial 
production is 46,7 % of gross value added. Employees in the public sector are about 40 % of the total 
employment in the Bulgarian economy.  
We will use the framework discussed in the previous section to analyse the driving forces for the 
specific Bulgarian property-rights transformation.   
 
B. Washington Consensus Privatisation Policy against Post-Communist Primitive Accumulation of 
Capital (1989-1996) 
 
  101. Initial conditions 
 
The most striking features of the initial conditions for property-rights transformation in Bulgaria 
were as follows: (i) nominal state ownership of enterprises; (ii) informal, implicit de facto total control by 
top communist nomenklatura (managers, bankers, state officials, Communist party leaders, secret services) 
over  all the enterprises and state institutions; (iii) tremendous uncertainty due to the volatile political 
environment, narrow-interest fighting groups and consequent short-time business horizons. The communist 
ruling group had some hypothetical strategies regarding institutional changes. First, designing a 
coordinated strategy with national development goals and establishing a legal and institutional framework 
for privatisation (given the real origin and goals of the communist nomenklatura-driven transition stated in 
the previous section, this opportunity has been regarded only as a theoretical one). Nevertheless, the 
presumption of a government programme, coordination and goals clearly stated were at the heart of the 
Washington Consensus suggestions for privatisation in transition countries. The second ‘strategy’ has been 
the looting of state-owned assets (budget, enterprises, banks). The latter strategy was typical of the period 
1989-1991 (and even before, but this is another story and probably more essential for understanding the so-
called “transition” in Bulgaria).  
 
2. Corporatization of state-owned enterprises  
 
In early 1990 the one-party system in Bulgaria was abolished; the state sector remains dominant 
while the private sector was burgeoning in small manufacturing, trade and services.
12 In  these  new 
conditions the large and medium-size state-owned enterprises began a process of corporatization 
(conversion into joint-stock or limited-liability companies, wholly owned by the state).
13 The first wave of 
this transformation began in 1989 when Decree No. 56, on Business Activity, came into effect. Since 1991 
the transformation of state enterprises into companies has been carried out according to the Commercial 
Code.
14 As a result of this process, in the early 1990s all major non-financial companies in Bulgaria were 
wholly state-owned. This unique hybrid form was defined as a ‘sole-trader joint-stock company’ or ‘sole-
trader limited-liability company' by the Commercial Code (Article 61). It is a temporary business form, and 
should have survived for up to five or six more years under the Privatisation Act (Article 19). This form of 
business organisation has been the starting point for the privatisation of enterprises in Bulgaria. In what 
follows, this form is referred to as the ‘sole-trader company', even though this represents a departure from 
the usual English meaning of this term, as it is a company with 100% state participation (for a detailed 
analysis of the ‘sole-trader company' in Bulgaria, see Peev (1995). 
Corporatisation of large enterprises in the early 1990s created confusion over the distribution of 
property rights. At the beginning of this process there was a shift of control rights to enterprise insiders, 
mainly managers. Decree No. 56 and subsequent practice reflected the enhanced power of communist 
nomenklatura managers. The inefficient behaviour of the so-called ‘insiders’ is well known from the 
literature (Voszka, 1992; Frydman & Rapaczynski, 1993).
15 The behaviour of directors belonging to the 
former communist nomenklatura was directed at bringing potentially efficient enterprises to a state of 
collapse and putting them up for sale through privatisation.  
After the first non-communist government in Bulgaria came to power in 1991, however, the 
motivation for privatisation of companies changed. The new government tried to reassert its ownership of 
the enterprises and to overcome the vagueness of the property rights created under communist rule. Under 
the influence of this government and the trade unions, new directors were appointed in some enterprises.
16 
                                                 
12 The coordination between economic units in Bulgaria in the early l990s has a peculiar character corresponding to one 
characterisation of the Hungarian economy in 1987: ‘neither plan nor market' (Schroeder, 1988). 
13 For the legal procedures of this process in Bulgaria, see Frydman, Rapaczynski & Earle (l993). 
14 Concrete facts on the genesis of ‘sole-trader joint-stock companies' in Bulgaria are presented in Peev (l992). 
15 Author’s informal interviews with state officers and new directors, unconnected with the communist nomenklatura, 
revealed that communist nomenklatura insiders in Bulgaria exhibit the same inefficient behaviour as in the other East 
European countries. 
16 Typically, the struggle for directors’ seats was stronger in large companies. An author’s investigation at the end of 
1993 showed that, of 70 companies, only 19 managing directors, just over 25%, remained from the former communist 
nomenklatura. The sample included 18 large companies with a workforce of over 500 people, of which only one had 
the same communist nomenklatura director. 
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ambivalent. On the one hand, the owner state has appointed the manager to defend the national interests by 
keeping the companies in operation and preparing them for efficient structural adjustment, including 
privatisation. On the other hand, however, the incumbent directors operated in unchanged conditions of 
power without responsibility. Opportunities have opened up for primitive accumulation of capital, and 
managers rather delayed the privatisation of their companies. 
Ownership structure. Empirical studies reveal the specific property-rights structure of the ‘sole-
trader company' (Peev, 1995). It was characterised as follows: (1) state ownership of assets; (2) the state 
bears the residual risk; (3) the government appoints a board of directors which manages and represents the 
company and appoints managers; (4) under the Act on Transformation and Privatisation of State-owned 
and Municipally-owned Enterprises in Bulgaria such companies must be privatised within five years of 
transformation. The ‘sole-trader company' was a transitional form of business organisation lying between 
the self-managed socialist enterprise and the modem corporation. 
There was an essential difference between a ‘sole-trader company' and a self-managed socialist 
enterprise. In the former the employees do not have property rights. This is a peculiarity of the ‘sole-trader 
company' in Bulgaria. In Hungary and Poland the workers' councils continued to exist after the 
commercialisation of enterprises, though in former Czechoslovakia they were disbanded after April 1990 
(Mejstrik, 1992). The essential similarity between a ‘sole-trader company' and a self-managed socialist 
enterprise is the preserving of state ownership of assets. 
Another essential feature of ‘sole-trader companies' was their peculiar genesis. Examination of the 
origins of companies indicates that administrative initiative from the executive power was the main factor 
in their establishment. More careful analysis of the dynamics of the process, month by month, reveals a 
strange surge prior to a pending election. This indicates that the establishment of companies occurs not so 
much as an adaptation to the changing economic environment but rather as a result of political and 
administrative processes. This means that the survival of a particular company should be guaranteed by the 
government even in the presence of high transaction costs associated with companies' adaptation to new 
markets, technological conditions, restructuring requirements and the like.
17 However, the government did 
not fulfil its obligations as owner, since it typically left companies to deal with these problems on their own. 
The main agents of property rights in a ‘sole-trader company' were the government as owner and 
the managers. The function of risk bearing, according to property-rights theory, was taken on by state 
officials and the function of management by managers. However, the state officials were risk bearers not 
because of their higher motivation for risk bearing but because of their status. 
Who was the actual bearer of the residual risk after the collapse of the CMEA and the shock 
stabilisation programme in Bulgaria at the beginning of the 1990s? While a given enterprise was in state 
ownership the government, as owner, is the economic agent that, according to the property-rights theory, 
must bear the residual consequences of shocks. The managers and workers of a particular enterprise have 
had no liability with respect to the external difficulties felt by the enterprise. In practice, however, state 
officials shifted all the liabilities of the transition onto the enterprise. The ‘sole-trader company' obtained 
so-called ‘autonomy', a hypothetical promise of discretion in the held of products, markets and investment. 
In fact, however, this was only quasi-autonomy because, first, the state remained the owner of the assets 
and shifted only the risk bearing connected with the economic reform to the companies; second, the risk 
bearer was again impersonal-managers or employees or the enterprise at large. 
 
The main shock for ‘sole-trader companies' at the beginning of transition was not so much the 
CMEA market  collapse as their ‘autonomy', their high degree of risk bearing and managerial discretion, 
on the one hand, without ownership of assets and company rights to sell assets, on the other. Case studies 
show that some companies have had a higher degree of ‘autonomy' than others. The reasons can be found 
in the complicated power distribution among state officials, managers and interest groups in each enterprise. 
In this way some companies win without effort, while others lose.  
Types of control. Who has had control over ‘sole-trader companies'? The simple view is that a 
100% state-owned enterprise is subject to effective state control. From that point of view the government 
has controlled newly founded companies, wholly owned by the state. But this is only the first impression, 
                                                 
17 For ideas on this point, see Pejovich (1990). 
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18 An overview of the literature on the 
separation of ownership from control of corporations in a developed economy provides some starting 
points for distinguishing types of control of ‘sole-trader companies'. However, every randomly selected 
criterion of types of corporate control fails to reflect faithfully the reality of the ‘sole-trader company'. The 
formal quantitative stake in corporate assets does not determine who has real control over a particular 
company. A more suitable classification of ‘sole-trader companies' by type of control is a qualitative one. 
Empirical studies show emerging specific control structures of state-owned companies in the Bulgarian 
economy in transition.
19 
Control based on unestablished property rights. These are property rights structures that fail to 
determine clearly who owns company assets, who are a bearer of residual risk, who is a decision maker, 
who appoints members of the board of directors.
20  
In this ownership structure, however, there were different degrees of managerial discretion. Using 
as a criterion the degree of managerial discretion based on unestablished property rights, distinct types of 
control of ‘sole-trader companies' can be identified. First, high managerial discretion owing to unclear 
property rights. These were companies with a high potential for discretionary managerial behaviour. This 
does not mean that their managers encourage strategies for opportunism and shirking and hence inefficient 
enterprise behaviour at large. Under post-communist conditions managerial discretion has had an 
ambivalent nature. On the one hand, more managerial discretion implies removal of barriers and scope for 
initiative. On the other hand, though, it involves less state intervention and leaves more room for shirking. 
Second, low managerial discretion owing to unclear property rights. These were companies with a low 
degree of scope for discretionary managerial behaviour. This does not mean that there is strong owner 
control, especially government control, and hence efficient monitoring over top managers and efficient 
enterprise responses at large. These companies were a peculiar transition type where in fact nobody has had 
control. On the one hand, less discretion implies a stronger involvement of state institutions in decision 
making, with the possibility of forcing managers to show initiative; on the other hand, less discretion also 
provides less opportunity for independent managerial initiative. Which tendency prevails can be shown 
only by empirical analysis (see Hare and Peev, 1994). 
Control based on interest groups influence. Another key feature of the control structure of the 
‘sole-trader company' was the influence of interest groups other than the state. There was a number of 
examples known from the Bulgarian press that demonstrated a three-agent structure of company 
management: state officials-owners, managers, and the emerging communist-capitalist web.
21 
In Bulgarian ‘sole-trader companies' interest groups other than the owner state have include 
political forces, finance groups, trade unions, etc. (for more detailed analysis of emerging communist-
capitalist web of interests groups, see point 5 below). In individual companies they have had different 
degrees of influence on management. The chief criterion for the strength of this influence is the degree of 
managerial discretion. Using this criterion of managerial discretion based on the influence of interest 
groups we can distinguish two types of companies. First, high managerial discretion owing to interest 
groups. These were companies in which labour exercised a low degree of influence on corporate operations 
(mainly over the appointment of managers and management). Here the managers have had more discretion 
but, on the other hand, they felt the restraining influence primarily of the trade unions but also of other 
forces. There was a peculiar type of monitoring of managers by groups other than the owner. The 
relationship between managers and interest groups was similar to that in the socialist enterprise. Everyone 
wields power without assuming responsibility. Second, low managerial discretion owing to interest groups. 
These were companies in which a strong influence was exerted by interest groups besides the nominal 
owner. Typically, these were large companies. The potential for discretionary managerial behaviour was 
low but in this situation the restraining effect on managers was not exerted by the nominal owner. Again no 
economic agent with strong owner motivation existed. 
Among ‘sole-trader companies' there were also companies with deliberately retained and clear 
government control. Examples of this type of company were to be found in the energy sector. But their 
                                                 
18 The Bulgarian press reveals a number of cases of backstage fights over appointments to boards of directors of some 
of the biggest Bulgarian enterprises in the electronics, machine-building and military industries. 
19 For more detailed examination of the control structures in the early transition years, see Peev and Hare (1995). 
20 This obscure ownership structure is typical in the post-communist countries (Frydman & Rapaczynski, 1992). 
21 See also Financial Times, l0 May 1994, ‘Ex-communists embrace a half-capitalist Bulgaria’. 
 
  13number was small and this control structure was not typical of the ‘sole-trader' structure of business 
organisation. 
Despite 100% state ownership, the ‘sole-trader companies' were mainly under managerial control 
and interest group control. These types of control were based on unestablished property rights and informal 
influence by groups other than the nominal owner state. This peculiar transitional kind of control was 
implicit and unstable. 
 
3. Privatisation and Newly Private Firms Establishment  
 
Privatisation. In 1989-1991, the process of unregulated and illegal transfer of capital from the 
state to private hands has begun. In April 1992, the Parliament has approved the ‘Transformation and 
Privatisation of State-Owned and Municipal-Owned Enterprises Act’ that has been amended many times in 
the years. The first regulated privatisation programme has been designed in 1993. However, till to end of 
1996 the privatisation process was slow. 
    Empirical studies show that the typical property-rights structure of the enterprises after their 
privatisation in 1992-96 is characterized as follows: 1) one party- private firm, personnel, managerial team 
etc., owns a big stake of assets, 2) all the shareholders owns the right of residual risk, 3) this party has the 
formal and factual right to appoints a board of directors, 4) all the shareholders have the right to sell their 
rights by public offering (Peev et all, 1999). This structure is similar to the ownership structure of the 
newly established private companies. Both privatised and private firms have concentration of the company 
assets in the hands of a large owner. The main agents of property rights in the privatised companies are the 
shareholders as owners and the managers. The function of risk bearing, according to property-rights theory, 
is taken on by shareholders and the function of management - by managers. However, the owners have 
high-risk aversion, typically the large shareholders are both shareholders and managers. Who is the actual 
bearer of the residual risk after the privatisation? While a given enterprise is in private ownership, the 
shareholders as owners are the economic agents that, according to the property-rights theory, must bear the 
residual consequences from the managerial decisions. In practice, the large shareholders of the firm have 
very close connection with the managers. These shareholders consist of other firms owned by managers, 
outside firms with managerial ownership stake, etc. The privatised company obtains a specific autonomy: 
(i) the large owner of the assets is the risk-bearer as well; (ii)  the government shifts the risk- bearing of the 
macroeconomic financial reform to the companies, and they become hostages of the potential government 
voluntarism. 
Till the end of 1996, the privatisation rate in Bulgaria was low. The privatised enterprises are small 
and medium-sized. Enterprises with a highly concentrated ownership structure are more frequent. From the 
point of view of control structure, the enterprises under outsider control are prevailing over the ones under 
insider control. The institution of the board of directors in privatised enterprises is characterized by the 
most active behaviour in comparison to the behaviour of the board of directors in enterprises with other 
forms of ownership. On the whole, the managers have the highest influence in  decision-making in the 
spheres of production and personnel, while in the spheres of managerial employment and compensation and 
the financial sphere - the board of directors is in charge.  
A specific case of coincidence between the dominant nominal owner and the real decision-maker 
in the firm are privatised enterprises under the control of a foreign investor. In these enterprises there is no 
separation of ownership and control. On the contrary, we observe a very strong owner control and owner 
participation in the management of the enterprises, typical of property-rights structures in the so-called 
‘classical’ capitalist firm.  
Privatised enterprises are characterized by efficient managerial strategies to restructuring, the most 
active being the enterprises under foreign owner control. Privatised enterprises have better performance 
(profitability, productivity, and age of capital) in comparison to state-owned enterprises. However, such 
kinds of conclusions are doubtful because in many cases it is not ownership structure which determines 
performance, but the other way round. The privatisation programmes select enterprises with better short-
term prospects and there are specific firm characteristics determining whether firms are privatised. 
Newly established private firms. The ownership structure of the private firms established de 
novo has had two main peculiarities. First, many firms were sole proprietorships, and very often their 
owner and manager are one and the same person. These firms have a similar ownership structure as the 
‘classical’ capitalist firm known from the literature of property rights. Second, few private enterprises 
are companies. Their ownership structure is characterized as follows: 1) high concentration of the assets 
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of residual risk, 3) the large shareholder has a seat in the board of directors and appoints the other 
members of the board, 4) the shareholders have the right to sell their shares. The key feature of the 
ownership structure described here is that the large owners bring more risk, and their personal welfare is 
closely connected with the viability of the firm. Their motivation adheres to the motivation of the owner-
entrepreneur of the ‘classical’ capitalist firm who is the sole bearer of both residual risk and managerial 
initiative. 
Private firms de novo have a more concentrated ownership structure than privatised firms. The 
dominant owner has a majority (50-80% of assets) or private control (over 80%). A typical dominant owner 
is the manager-owner. There is no separation of ownership and control, and a most efficient managerial 
behaviour is expected. The newly founded private firms showed passive strategies to enterprise 
restructuring, which is explainable taking into consideration their origin. Private firms de novo show the 
best performance (profitability, productivity, and age of capital) compared to all the other firms. This 
indicated that in spite of the unfavourable semi-market environment their ownership structure induced life-
giving incentives of adaptation. 
However, the existence of ‘crony’ private firms is a specific case. These firms receive a strong 
political support. Typically in the early transition, Bulgarian banks pumped resources from state institutions 
and state budget and transferred them as loans to ‘crony private’ firms and state loss-makers. The latter 
shifted financial resources through transfer pricing or other devices to ‘crony private’ firms (for more 
details, see point 5 below).  
 
4. Globalisation factors for corporate governance change 
 
From 1989 to 1996 in Bulgaria, the Washington Consensus policy, and privatisation in particular, 
were seen as an efficient policy designed against the looting of state enterprises and the whole Bulgarian 
economy.  The stabilization programme started in February 1991 with support by the IMF, but very soon 
the austere measures in the field of the monetary policy (September 1991) were abandoned (Agency for 
Economic Forecasting and Development, Annual Report, 1994). In 1991, the World Bank presented 
specific requirements regarding the Bulgarian foreign debt service before its structural adjustment loan 
(SAL) to be granted. In 1992 under the World Bank impact as a loan conditionality (first SAL for 100 
million USD), the Bulgarian government implemented a programme for promoting discipline on state-
owned enterprises but it was not enacted in practice (Vutcheva, 2001). The economic policy remained 
inconsistent, the lack of coordination and public consensus about its goals was a key policy trait at that 
period. The Bulgarian foreign debt service was resumed in 1994 (after the moratorium in March 1990) 
when the government signed an agreement with the London club creditor banks for re-scheduling and debt 
restructuring. The so-called structural reform (privatisation, state loss-makers liquidation, legal reform, 
etc.) was fostered by the World Bank as loan conditionality. In the period 1991-96, the World Bank issued 
loans of USD 500 million, about half of this sum being for ‘structural adjustment’. In the period 1989-1996 
in Bulgaria, the international financial institutions and the Washington Consensus policy played the role of 
factors for ‘market economy’ development (against the communist past), ‘privatisation’ (against post-
communist primitive accumulation of capital or simply the looting of national wealth), legal environment 
development (against institutional vacuum), last but not least, pro-Western development  (against the 
Russian ‘imperial’ impact).             
Surprisingly, however, the Bulgarian practice follows neither the good objectives formulated in 
the different recommendations put forward by privatisation advisers, nor even the privatisation programmes 
themselves.
22 There was another logic of economic reform of state enterprises and it can be seen in the 
specific power distribution among the potential key players: (i) the emerging entrepreneurs and other forces 
for ‘catching-up’ and national development; (ii) Washington Consensus institutions; (iii) the communist-
capitalist web – the real driving force for the so-called ‘transition’ in Bulgaria.  
 
                                                 
22 After the collapse of the communist regime in Bulgaria at the end of 1989 different governments (Dmitar Popov; 
Filip Dimitrov) declared their strong intention to privatise the state-owned sector. The next Bulgarian government 
(Luben Berov) called itself ‘the government of privatisation'. Despite all these ambitions only five large enterprises had 
been privatised by the beginning of 1994 (Annual Report of Agency for Privatisation, 1993). 
  155. Effects of post-communist primitive accumulation of capital on corporate governance change  
 
  Establishment of a ‘crony’ communist-capitalist web. The phenomenon described as ‘state 
capture’ (Hellman et all, 2000) following the World Bank and EBRD survey in 1999 can be found at the 
very beginning of transition in Bulgaria. There were some steps of state capture development. First, the 
collapse of the communist totalitarian control of the state, the Communist party, the repressive bodies, and 
banks on all the economic activities. Second, the establishment of groups of interests (‘Multigroup’, 
‘TRON’, etc. at the very beginning, coalition ‘G-13’ in 1994, ‘Orion’ in 1995) and ‘crony’ private 
institutions (non-financial firms, banks, insurance companies, etc.) based on ‘state - Communist party – 
repressive bodies (including KGB) - state-owned banks – state-owned enterprises’ network, which we can 
define as ‘communist-capitalist web’. Their members used to be representatives of control institutions of 
the former totalitarian regime. They had full information about all aspects of the economic, political, 
private, etc. life in Bulgaria.
23 The interest groups named above captured the state. The government with 
Prime Minister Berov (1992-94) was known as the ‘Multigroup’s government’; the next socialist 
government with Prime Minister Videnov (1995-96) established close connections with another interest 
group, ‘Orion’. ‘G-13’ was a confederation of bid industrials (de facto different interest groups in the web), 
which received a monopoly position in the sectors of energy, transport, military industry, chemicals, and 
some others.  
  The key factors determining the behaviour of the ‘web’ were as follows: (i) tremendous political 
uncertainty; (ii) information asymmetry between the web and the rest of society; (iii) lack of institutional 
constraints to their potential opportunistic behaviour (members of the web had worked in governance 
institutions of the former totalitarian regime and more importantly, some had preserved their positions); (iv) 
omnipotent control over all the resources in Bulgaria. Theoretically, under conditions of lack of 
institutional constraints, informal rules and internal motivations (like patriotism, nationalism) may have an 
impact on business behaviour. In the Bulgarian practice, however, after about fifty years of communist 
regime, the negative social selection was nominated for Communist party leaders, only people loyal to 
Moscow (some had preserved the same attitudes changing only the direction of their service after 1989). 
The behaviour of ‘web’ members was rational. Their utility function was maximal transfer of state 
resources to private hands (individuals, private companies). However, to fulfil this objective the rational 
behaviour required a long-term specific investment in specific organizations and agents (‘crony’ firms, 
‘crony’ banks, political parties).  
  State capture. In the early transition in Bulgaria, state capture, or better, society capture consisted 
of specific forms. First, web members’ promotion of people to key political parties and state positions, 
called ‘investment’ in new persons (capture of parliament, government, state bodies like the Bulgarian 
National Bank, the Bulgarian Consolidation Company, etc., the court system). This means that the 
institutional and legal environment for corporate governance change was shaped in accordance with the 
‘web’ interests. The process of law enforcement obeyed the same interests. For example, in 1992-1994 the 
specific governance institutions for control on monetary policy and bank system (special commissions of 
the Parliament and the Council of Ministers) never monitored the governor of the Bulgarian National Bank 
(Pejkov, 1996). Second, the same process of preserving web positions or penetration through ‘new faces’ 
(through the newly established trade union ‘Podkrepa’) into top management and board of directors’ 
structures in state-owned enterprises or in state-owned banks was observed. The result of this process was 
the establishment of ‘web’-based principal – agent relations. Principals and agents, state banks creditors 
and private ‘crony firms debtors, state managers and private ‘crony’ firms owners, state officials in 
                                                 
23 According to some investigators, the “transition” in Bulgaria had began before 1989, as early as 1985. In January 
1985 the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party has established with Resolution 
No.68 a special party-state commission for a science-technical policy designated for industrial intelligence. People 
involved in these projects used project funds, firms established in the West, etc. to build up later the web of interest 
groups, banks, firms that have been the real driving forces of the transition since 1989. No statistics are available to 
assess the financial damage for the Bulgarian society from these operations. However, there were some indirect 
indicators as the fast growing foreign debt during 1985-1989 (in USD billion: 1984 – USD 2,9; 1985 – 3,8; 1986 – 5,8; 
1987 – 8,2; 1988 – 8,9; 1989 – 10,7). Even in 2002, about 15 years later, there is no official information and analysis 
about the real foreign loans utilization at that time.  
 
  16corporate governance monitoring institutions (like the Bulgarian National Bank for banks and the 
Ministries for state-owned firms) and managers or bankers belonged to the same ‘ web’. Politicians from 
different parties – communist and anti-communist, belonged to the same web, too.  In fact, the real agency 
issues were between the ‘web’ and the society as a whole (entrepreneurs, independent non-crony firms, 
households). Expectations that the emerging web would establish an efficient corporate governance system 
were illusions because this meant they should constrain themselves (incredibly, from both theoretical and 
practical viewpoint). 
  Forms of primitive accumulation of capital. Some forms of state capture and illegal state assets 
transfers to private structures were as follows. First, one of the secrets of the Bulgarian transition remains 
what happened to the sums collected through foreign state debt financing. However, the mismanagement of 
the external loans received since 1991 from the EU, the World Bank, EU Programme PHARE and 
countries like Austria, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Japan, Switzerland can clarify to some extent the foreign 
debt usage. These sums designated for the so-called structural reform of state enterprises were collected in 
a specially established ‘State Fund for Reconstruction and Development’ in 1991. In 1991-95 the gross sum 
of the received loans was USD 958,3 mln. However, contrary to the fund designation, these sums were not 
used for state enterprises restructuring but mainly for short-term credits for state enterprises with liquidity 
problems (some of them big loss-makers like ‘Balkan’, ‘Kremikovtzi’, defence complex enterprises, etc.). 
Finally, the fund was closed down in 1998 and the state budget had to pay the debt due to foreign creditors. 
In fact, the real beneficiaries were not state-owned firms, which received credits but ‘crony’ firms 
squeezing their resources and the real loser – the state budget and the Bulgarian society as a whole.   
  Second, closing down the existing state-owned economic associations (i.e. groups of affiliated 
companies) in 1990-91 and transferring their credits to state-owned enterprises. During 1989-91 these 
associations transferred money to establish private companies abroad and banks in Bulgaria.  
 Third,  decapitalization  of  state-owned banks through ‘bad’ credits from bankers to ‘crony’ private 
firms, ‘crony’ private banks (e.g. ‘Credit bank’, ‘Kristalbank’, ‘First private bank’, ‘Mollov’,etc.), business 
groups (‘Multigroup’, ‘TRON’,etc.), and individuals belonging to the web of communist-capitalist 
connections. There is a special term coined about these kinds of debtors – ‘credit millionaires’. A similar 
scheme was the transfer of ‘bad’ credits from state-owned banks to state-owned firms that were intrinsic 
loss-makers, and then from state-owned firms to ‘crony’ private firms.  Following the inflation process in 
1991-92 the government did not manage to revaluate assets of state enterprises that had led to low 
depreciation norms and decapitalization. In hindsight, it seems that a typical strategy for the ruling web was 
using state-owned enterprises as residual risk-bearers of external decisions and transferring losses to 
enterprises (e.g. bad credits under communist regime before 1991 that were de facto a centralized 
distribution of credits to enterprises).    
Fourth, decapitalization of state-owned enterprises. The typical relationship between ‘crony’ 
private firms and state owned enterprises was based on 'input-output' price transfer scheme, where private 
firms, owned by state enterprise managers (or their relatives), were suppliers and customers of the same 
state enterprise. The consequences were as follows: state enterprise - residual risk bearer, private firms - 
profit takers, and decapitalization of the state enterprise. In fact, the relationship between the state and some 
private enterprises (‘crony’ ones) was like between victim and vampire rather than between equal economic 
agents.  
Fifth, transfers from the state budget. A small part of this scheme included transfers to newly-
established ‘crony’ private banks (e.g. ‘Turistsportbank’, ‘First private bank’, etc.), business groups, and 
firms, through ‘credits’ from the military-industrial complex, via the service of the Bulgarian railways 
company, using the state fund ‘TNTM’, other budget activities, etc.    
Primitive accumulation of capital and capital flight are two essential parts of post-communist 
transformation. Key factors inducing new domestic capitalists to transfer capital abroad were: (i) property-
rights uncertainty and threat from expropriation; (ii) internationalist values and attitudes of the new private 
owners. No official data are available on the actual capital flight and primitive accumulation.  (Some 
studies estimate the total sum of state assets transferred to the ‘crony’ communist-capitalist web for the 
period 1985-95 to have amounted to the equivalent of USD 13 billion, see, Pejkov,1996). However, it is 
difficult to verify the exact sum).      
 
6. Key actors: ‘communist-capitalist web’, Washington Consensus institutions, Bulgarian population  
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against the communist-capitalist web discretionary behaviour could be: (i) entrepreneurship based 
opposition-oriented to the national development and ‘catching-up’ (in fact, very weak at that time); (ii) 
large state-owned enterprises (in fact, the interests of workers coincide with managerial interests in delay of 
liquidation or privatisation of their firms); (iii) international actors. Among the latter, the emerging Russian 
interest groups (very similar to the Bulgarian ones) have played a negative role for the independent market 
development in Bulgaria.  
The position of the Washington Consensus institutions (IMF, World Bank) was specific. These 
external institutions were the only possible coalition for collective action in the early transition in Bulgaria 
that could have constrained rent-seeking and looting-oriented behaviour. In fact, under pressure by these 
institutions some necessary laws (among them the law of privatisation) were adopted. In hindsight, it seems 
that after the default on the Bulgarian debt in March 1990, the emerging ‘web’ was searching for external 
financial support. However, this illegal web never tried to design a real consistent policy for national 
development. They used international loans like the former communist leaders in the 1980s had done – 
without coordination or a strategy for a long-term national development.  
Surprisingly, there existed a mutual interest in the Washington Consensus policy among the 
emerging ruling web, international financial institutions and the Bulgarian population. The latter has had 
special attitudes, beliefs and preferences. First, in the early 90s, the Bulgarian society was divided into two 
groups due to the long existing “crony” socialist relations favouring communist nomenklatura members. 
This artificial ‘communist – anti-communist’ division had its deep roots of real alienation of people in: (i) 
the ruling communist nomenklatura and the state itself (labelled as “totalitarian state”); (ii) socialist state 
ownership; (iii) socialist society and socialist home country.  Under these conditions of alienation, the 
Washington Consensus ideas for withdrawal of the state from the economic life, privatisation of state-
owned firms and adherence to the more developed world based on liberal international market economy 
principles seemed quite reasonable. New liberal international economic order values have had a good 
reception by post-communist beliefs and attitudes. 
Second, at the same time (and this is one of the key contradictions in transition), adherence to the 
communist values of collectivism, etatism and egalitarism carried on.
24 These social attitudes were used by 
the Washington policy designers and filled with new content that strangely resembles the old communist 
tenets. Thus, important pillars of the new policy adoption were new “market-oriented” beliefs that: (i) a 
social engineering process like the transition could be successful and ten years were enough to build a 
market economy; (ii) anybody else (in the past - the Communist party committee, now, for example, the 
IMF or well-experienced Western advisers) would know better what the national interest was and what 
policy would defend it better; (iii) emerging new private owners would be the new heroes, “captains of the 
transition”. At the same time, these beliefs were based on limited knowledge or no knowledge at all about 
the real economic situation in Bulgaria and mechanisms of economic transformation in general. However, 
these attitudes were harnessed to the ideology of the Washington Consensus policy to development aiming 
at a free market economy. Even at that time, this seemed strange and contradictory. Ten years later Kornai 
called this policy both “vulgar Marxism” and “vulgar Coase-ism” (Kornai, 2001). However, the specific 
post-communist culture described above cannot explain per se the Washington Consensus policy 
transplantation in the Bulgaria conditions. Two other factors played a crucial role: (i) the high foreign debt 
and, consequently, the strong IMF impact on the Bulgarian policy and (ii) internationalist political elite in 
Bulgaria serving foreign interests under communism and motivated to preserve its attitudes in transition too.    
  In the early transition years in Bulgaria, the ‘internal contradiction’ (Mansur Olson) of the 
enormous power of parasitic forces for collective action (the emerging communist-capitalist web of former 
top communist nomenklatura, totalitarian secret services, etc.) was observed. These forces had to design an 
efficient corporate governance system (ownership, control, legal and regulation environment) 
simultaneously preserving the status quo, their power. This has created the dual character of the 
corporate governance design in transition: (i) corporatization should have been a process of 
transformation of socialist state enterprises, establishing more efficient governance structures, but de facto 
it was a corporate governance change favourable for looting the state-owned companies; (ii) privatisation 
                                                 
24 For the contradictory nature of post-communist beliefs and norms, see Peev (1990). The author coined a special 
concept, ’economysticism’, trying to explain the specific transition phenomena more properly. 
 
 
  18should have been a transfer of state assets to private firms to enhance allocative efficiency, but in fact it 
was designed to loot state assets and to transfer them to  ‘crony’ private firms; (iii) the new private sector 
established both independent private firms and also ‘crony’ private firms aiming at state assets 
expropriation; (iv) the legal system and law enforcement should have been designed to constrain insiders 
and the totalitarian state, and to defend creditors and shareholders, but de facto it led to a weak, captured 
state, and strong captors and ‘crony’ firms.  
 
C. Washington Consensus Privatisation Panacea against Post-Privatisation Reality (1997-2001) 
 
1. Voucher privatisation 
 
  Since 1996 there has been acceleration of the privatisation process (Table 5). The basic forms 
applied were a Czech-like voucher privatisation (named ‘mass privatisation’ in Bulgaria) and management-
employee buy-outs (MEBO). In 1996-97, 1050 enterprises were included in the mass privatisation 
programme and about 15% of the state assets were privatised through voucher privatisation. This scheme 
was designed by the socialist government (Prime Minister Videnov). The officially stated objective was to 
satisfy the demands for social justice and to carry out a fast transfer of state assets. According to the 
scheme, every Bulgarian citizen resident of the country, over the age of 18 was entitled (practically free of 
charge) to receive 25,000 investment vouchers. In contrast, in developed market economies, share 
purchases involve opportunity costs that induce shareholders to pursue wealth maximization objectives. 
However, the Bulgarian give-away scheme created a specific lack of interest on the part of the citizens – 
potential small shareholders, in companies’ affairs due to the practical lack of opportunity costs to acquire 
shares. 81 privatisation funds were established, entitled to collect vouchers and build their own capital. 
Around half of the potential participants took their vouchers and 2.5 million (bearing about 80% of 
vouchers) transferred them to privatisation funds. These funds participated in auctions to ‘invest’ collected 
vouchers in companies involved in the programme for mass privatisation. In fact, this was a give-away 
scheme for privatisation funds (established mainly by domestic banks and managers of state-owned 
enterprises). The bulk of privatisation funds belonged to the communist-capitalist ‘crony’ web described 
above. After collusions among ex-privatisation funds to redistribute and concentrate their holdings in 
different enterprises, 15 largest funds owned about 10% of the former state assets.  
Privatisation funds were later transformed into holding companies. The emerging ownership and 
control structures were specific. Holding company ownership in a given subsidiary was concentrated, the 
typical control being the majority one, but the ownership of holding companies itself was dispersed. The 
ultimate control of a subsidiary company was a minority and managerial one. However, the risk-bearing 
function was quite specific: (i) holding companies’ main shareholders (ex-privatisation funds founders) 
received company assets practically free of charge; (ii) they could expropriate profits from good projects 
and shift losses from bad ones to small dispersed shareholders. The typical ownership structure formed was 
dispersed ownership with managerial or minority control exercised by the new holding companies (former 
privatisation funds). The specific separation of ownership and control has led to inefficient behaviour 
models: (i) ex-privatisation funds founders (minority controlling shareholders of holding companies) 
behaving against small dispersed shareholders (through tunnelling, looting, etc.); (ii) incompetent ex-
privatisation funds founders (majority shareholders of subsidiaries) faced discretionary managerial 
behaviour. In fact, these theoretical predictions were corroborated. The new large owners after mass 
privatisation showed deteriorating financial results after privatisation (Table 6). The typical behaviour of 
holding companies was sale of assets, debt increasing, and negligible dividends distribution. Their profits 
and profitability were diminishing.  
 
2. Management-employees buy-outs (MEBO) 
 
In 1997, with the support of the international financial institutions a basic institutional change was 
introduced, a currency board. The Washington Consensus policy was put on the agenda again in Bulgaria, 
like at the very beginning of transition in 1990s. The basic task of the new government (Prime Minister 
Kostov) was financial stabilization, rapid privatisation of state enterprises (to compensate for lost time), 
liquidation of the state-owned loss-makers. During 1997-2001 the tenets of the Washington Consensus 
regarding privatisation became an official policy.   
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between policy makers and managers. A large part of the privatisation was taken by the management-
employees buy-outs (MEBO). In 1998 about 74,4% of the privatisation deals were MEBO, in 1999 – this 
share was 39%, and significantly dropped (after the critique by the IMF and the World bank)  in 2000. The 
MEBO scheme allowed management-employees teams to buy enterprises in cash under preferential   
conditions (discount to 10% of the price offered and payment of the remaining 90% through instalments in 
a ten years’ period). However, in fact, the finance sources for privatisation belonged to interests groups 
outside the enterprises. Managers were only formal participants in this process. The real control was held 
by outsiders.  
This scheme created in practice specific governance problems: (i) agency issues between 
managers and employee-shareholders regarding wage determination, layoffs, etc; (ii) a shortage of 
investment needed for enterprise restructuring. In fact, after the inefficient post-privatisation performance 
and failures to fulfil privatisation contract obligations, some of the contracts with companies privatised 
through MEBO were cancelled (Public register of unsuccessful privatisation deals that will be cancelled by 
the Privatisation Agency, Privatisation Agency, Bulgaria).  
 
3. Key players: Washington Consensus institutions, anti-communist ‘crony’ web, and foreign 
investors 
 
The  state officials in privatisation bodies (Agency for Privatisation, ministries, etc.) were not 
neutral about the privatisation method chosen. ‘Open’ procedures (auctions, public offers) accounted for 
only 7% while ‘closed’ procedures (tenders, negotiations) were 93% of the total number of deals for the 
period 1993-99 (Privatisation Agency). The Council of Ministers was formally in charge of the 
privatisation of natural monopolies and a special list of companies, but de facto it was involved in many 
privatisation deals. In practice, there was dispersion of responsibilities of different decision-makers in the 
privatisation process. The legal and regulatory framework of privatisation allowed high state officials 
discretion and lack of transparency. There was no regulation regarding the selection of privatisation 
procedures. The method (procedure) of direct negotiations was the least regulated and most discretionary 
(in practice, most frequently applied by state officials!). The ‘closed’ procedures required a commitment of 
new owners concerning investment, number of employees, etc. that created a necessity of post-privatisation 
control by state officials. However, the post-privatisation control was very controversial. On the one hand, 
there were cases of discretionary state intervention in the private property-rights domain and potential 
corruption. On the other hand, the state officials were ‘selective’ regarding ‘crony’ and independent firms. 
This is a typical case of the dual face of the state in transition – captured, weak (for the web of captor 
members) but bureaucratic, interventionist (regarding independent firms). The final result of the 
privatisation process (de facto prevailing tenders and negotiations) was a low cash flow for the budget and 
rent-seeking activities by state officials.      
 The  anti-communist government with Prime Minister Ivan Kostov was the first Bulgarian 
government since 1990 with a clear EU-accession and market-economy orientation. The currency board 
together with the new parliamentary majority excluding former communist parties greatly increased the 
stability in the country. This government was anti-communist but nevertheless the ‘crony’ relationship style 
of privatisation established by the former communist governments was going on. There was only a change 
of the ‘crony’ actors. A new ‘crony’ network ‘Olympus’ was established. However, many of the 
government leaders and politicians of the ruling ‘anti-communist’ coalition, Union of Democratic Forces, 
were well known faces from the very beginning of transition (for example, Prime Minister Kostov was a 
member of the government in 1991). This can indicate that despite some policy differences between ex-
communist (the Socialist party) and anti-communists, their origin at the beginning of transition and 
political behaviour in 1997-2001 showed a mutual interest to preserve the status quo.   
  Foreign participation in the privatisation process was humble (Table  7).  Foreign investors 
preferred green field investment. On the other hand, portfolio investments were negligible due to the 
undeveloped capital market. The Washington Consensus expectations regarding the foreign investment 
concerned the introduction of a new market-oriented style of management. For the time being, however, 
enterprises under foreign control have showed mixed performance. First, foreign investors with long-term 
traditions and reputation had the expected performance (like Solvay (chemicals), Union Miniere Group 
(copper), Brewinvest (brewery), etc.). Second, there exists another type of foreign investors, however, with 
specific features: (i) unclear origins of capital (sometimes a Bulgarian one!); (ii) a public unknown for the 
  20Western market; (iii) based in off-shore zones, which is normal for the Western practice but not for 
transition countries (see for example, the case of Gad Zeevi (Israel), which privatised the Bulgarian 
national air carrier ‘Balkan’).     
Finally, the driving force for the currency board establishment and for the policy design of the 
government in 1997-2001 were the Washington Consensus institutions (especially the IMF). According to 
some recent studies, the currency board introduction satisfies the IMF interests because it enables Bulgaria 
to service its foreign debt (for more details about the IMF role in post-communist countries, see Stone, 
2000). The payments of the external debt were a first priority of the budget under real restrictive monetary 
and fiscal policies. The currency board story is out of the scope of the present analysis but these findings 
confirm the notion of ‘methodological nationalism’ and the need for studying globalisation factors as an 
essential part of national institutional changes.       
From the point of view of the enterprise sector, the economic policy seemed to be aimed 
simultaneously at different objectives: of the international financial institutions (the IMF, the World Bank), 
of the market-oriented and the EU accession-oriented Bulgarian government, and of the agents with looting 
behaviour (the economic legacy of the previous ten years). For example, in the autumn of 1998, at the 
conclusion of the three-year agreement between Bulgaria and the IMF, the IMF emphasized the export 
demand while the government the domestic demand as the priority source of economic growth.  In 1998, 
the report of the EU Commission on the progress of Bulgaria to accession mentioned corruption as a 
serious problem, but it remained on the agenda in the following years.  
In 1997-2001, privatisation driven by international financial institutions led to mediocre results. 
After the general elections in June 2001, the new government (Primer Minister the former Bulgarian king 
Simeon II) prepared a public register of unsuccessful privatisation deals that the Privatisation Agency 
should cancel. According to different estimates, these deals are about 200 but for the time being the list 
consists of 48 new owners, including private owners after the MEBO scheme and foreign investors (source: 
Privatisation Agency).        
 
D. Property-Rights Transformation Outcomes  
 
   The emerging ownership and control picture of the Bulgarian economy has been too complicated 
and changeable but two important characteristics can be outlined: (i) dual enterprise sector; (ii) ownership 
heterogeneity.   
 
1. Dual enterprise sector  
 
  The most important aspect of the enterprise sector in Bulgaria in the 1990s is its duality. There are 
simultaneously two types of enterprises and two types of corporate culture in the Bulgarian economy: normal 
and ‘transitional’. The first type shows a clear structure of property rights (newly founded private firms and 
privatised firms with market motivated owners). The others are corporatized state-owned enterprises 
(including the biggest state-owned loss-makers), state enterprises in process of privatisation, newly founded 
private firms and privatised enterprises with owners oriented towards the expropriation of state assets and 
other ‘transition” attitudes. The grey economy and the household production for own consumption belong to 
the second group. The existence of the second type of enterprises and its interaction with the first type gives 
rise to a dual economic culture. The same economic agents have to show market-oriented behaviour with the 
market-oriented subjects and perverse behaviour on other occasions. The macroeconomic signals of the 
currency board are refracted through this culture. It is difficult for policy-makers to predict enterprise 
behaviour. 
 
2. Ownership heterogeneity  
 
  The emerging ownership heterogeneity based on the state enterprise transformation is another important 
characteristic of corporate governance in Bulgaria. The concentration or dispersion of ownership, majority 
owner control or managerial control, the board of directors and other internal governance mechanisms are not 
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different governance mechanisms have been developed and a common characteristic of all surviving 
companies is that they have constrained the potential managerial opportunism. In transition economies under 
conditions of tremendous uncertainty, there has been managerial inclination to short-run company survival 
strategies. The long-run survival depends on access to investable funds and innovation. The basic property-
rights structures observed and survival strategies are summarized below.  
First, corporatized state-owned enterprises. The owner - the government - has withdrawn from 
control, and managers and other non-owners have discretion to decapitalise the enterprises in their favour. 
In the short run, managers adopt strategies for their utility maximization through primitive accumulation of 
capital at the expense of company state-owned assets (price transfer to ‘crony’ private firms, ‘bad’ credits 
and re-distribution of loans received for pet projects, outright looting, etc.). Under these circumstances, in 
the short run companies can survived accumulating payment arrears. In fact, the loss-making behaviour of 
companies has been tolerated from the state authorities. Unconditional financial bailout operations are 
typical policy measures, especially in the early transition years. State-owned enterprises survive living on 
bad credits thanks to this ‘soft’ budget constraints policy. The efficient corporate governance 
transformation of these enterprises is from control based on unestablished property-rights to fighting among 
interests groups for explicit corporate control and privatisation. However, the improved property-rights 
arrangements would be not relevant if soft credits prevail and companies would be able to seek survival 
there rather to satisfy consumers’ demands.  
Second,  privatised enterprises with dispersed ownership and perverse behaviour. These are 
privatised enterprises with dispersed ownership. Their inefficient behaviour is shown not only by managers 
but also by the new controlling shareholders. The latter are typically not entrepreneurs and do not have 
owner’s market motivation. The ex-privatisation funds transformed into holding companies after the mass 
privatisation are a typical case of this type of new private owners. How their subsidiaries survive? In the 
short run, in the following years after the mass privatisation in 1997, there has been re-distribution of funds 
among subsidiaries under the holding company control. However, neither shareholder value nor subsidiary 
restructuring is the driving strategy rather controlling shareholders desire to advance their own utility 
through tunnelling (channel money to their own accounts usually abroad).  The further transformation of 
these enterprises is to ownership concentration and emergence of new objectives of owners. Secondary 
privatisation is due through internal mechanisms or capital markets. 
Third,  privatised enterprises with concentrated ownership and perverse behaviour. These are 
enterprises, whose ownership is concentrated, but their owners stand for a post-totalitarian corporate culture 
and pursue assets-stripping strategies. Typically these firms are privatised by MEBO schemes and are 
formally under insiders control after their privatisation. However, some foreign investors belong to this 
group too (for example, the Gad Zeevi case mentioned above). In the short run, these companies can 
survive selling their assets. The efficient development of these enterprises requires secondary privatisation 
(it can be through liquidation, too) and a change of owners. 
Fourth, privatised enterprises with dispersed ownership and market-oriented behaviour. Ironically, 
this ownership structure, typical for the Anglo-American corporate governance models, is not typical in 
Bulgaria after the Washington Consensus driven privatisation. These are privatised enterprises with 
dispersed ownership whose inefficiency is due to a high degree of managerial discretion. Ownership 
concentration and introduction of governance mechanisms for disciplining managers, known in market 
economy, need to be introduced. 
Fifth, privatised enterprises with concentrated ownership and market-oriented behaviour. These 
are enterprises where the behaviour of large shareholders is in favour of both short-run and long-run 
development. Here, the basic problem is not the contradiction between owners and managers, but rather 
that between large and small shareholders. Typically, foreign investors belong to this group (see, for 
example, the Solvay-Sodi and Union Miniere cases of large shareholder discretionary behaviour   against 
small shareholders’ interests (Bates, Cook, 2000). Governance mechanisms for protection of small 
shareholders are to be developed. 
 
E. Capital Markets Emergence 
 
For the time being the Bulgarian capital market is fragile in comparison with the securities 
markets developments in other post-communist countries (Table 8). Three stages of its evolution can be 
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after the general elections in June 2001, when former financial analysts in the London City became 
ministers in the new Bulgarian government. 
In the early transition since 1992, the only legal framework regulating shares was the Commercial 
Code. There existed about twenty companies and about twenty stock exchanges. The outcome was the 
market crash in 1995; many companies went bankrupt and their founders and managers escaped abroad 
with the shareholders’ funds. 
The mass privatisation program in 1996-97 was the driving force of the further development of 
capital markets and their regulation. The Bulgarian Stock Exchange – Sofia (BSE-Sofia) began to function 
on 21 October 1997. The stock exchange initially functioned under the Law on Securities, Stock Exchanges 
and Investment Companies (1995), which was replaced by the Law on Public Offering of Securities (1 
February 2000). Basic institutions established to regulate the market were: the Bulgarian Stock Exchange –
Sofia (a semi-private institution for securities trading), the Securities and Stock Exchange Commission (a 
regulatory body overseeing securities markets, recently renamed as the State Securities Commission) and 
the Central Depository (registering transfers and shareholdings in companies). 
The stock exchange activity was very small. Till the end of 1997 only three transactions were 
concluded. After that, following the mass privatisation, there was a sharp increase in the listed companies 
(1040) in 1998 and a following decline (861) in December 1999. The total market capitalization of all the 
listed companies amounted to BGL 1 702 billion that amounted to about 7,4 % GDP in 1999 (Table 9). 
However, these numbers cannot by themselves explain the real capital market maturity. For comparison, in 
the Czech Republic about 1716 companies traded on the Prague Stock Exchange in 1996, in Poland – only 
253 companies traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, but the Czech experience was much more 
inefficient than the Polish one (see Coffee,1999).  
Despite the regulatory framework establishment, striking traits of the Bulgarian securities market 
are as follows: (i) low credibility of the market, (ii) low liquidity; (iii) lack of efficient governance 
mechanisms. First, the Bulgarian Stock Exchange was divided into two markets: the official one (C, B and 
A market segments with listing requirements increasingly stringent and a market segment for corporate 
bonds) and a free market with listing requirements less stringent (see Table 9). Of 861 companies listed in 
1999, only 32 have been listed on the more “qualitative” official market, and the reminder 829 companies 
were listed on the free market. But even among the companies listed on the official market there were only 
3 in segment A (the most stringent requirements), 5 companies in segment B, and 24 companies in segment 
C. This means that the reputational integrity of the market as a whole was very low and the bulk of the 
companies placed there after mass privatisation could not fulfil more strict requirements for listening in 
higher market segments. Second, the illiquidity of the Bulgarian securities market is another important 
feature. The annual stock market turnover decreased from 1998 to 1999 by about 40 %. The main factors 
were limited stock supply because companies gained no advantages after being listed (because of additional 
disclosure rules requirements, decrease in managerial discretion, low probability of raising capital through 
equity market). There was little foreign portfolio investor interest, especially after the Asian and Russian 
crises in 1997-98. Third, the illiquidity of the market diminishes the role of the capital market as a 
disciplining device against the potential managerial opportunism. The market for corporate control, 
especially hostile takeover, cannot play its role of a governance mechanism because of concentrated 
ownership, lack of information about company shareholdings and lack of mechanisms for communication 
among minority shareholders. 
However, the specific traits of the Bulgarian capital market described above can be understood 
only in the framework of mass privatisation based on the Washington Consensus policy to transition. The 
policy intentions of establishing many private owners quickly that would behave as rational private agents 
in securities markets gave rise to paradoxical results: (i) capital markets institutions were utilized not as a 
market place but only for formal registration of collusions among privatisation funds; (ii) the main 
obstacles to efficient company restructuring after mass privatisation were private controlling shareholders. 
The stock exchange as a pseudo-market institution. Like board of directors’ utilization in 
corporatized state-owned enterprises as a specific mechanism for looting and against company restructuring 
in the early transition, the stock exchange is another example that “institution-building” remedy is very 
important but not sufficient under the specific transition conditions. The Bulgarian experience shows how 
this ‘market mechanism’ could be used simply for imitation and for disguising the real purpose of mass 
privatisation. In Bulgaria, all the listed companies on the stock exchange were listed through the mass 
privatisation process and the main capital market activity of privatisation funds was re-distribution of 
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shares (trade involving more than 200 000 shares) and key goals were private benefits of fund managers, 
directors and controlling shareholders. The stock exchange was used only to register already conducted 
trades. These trades led to ownership concentration and dilution of minority stakes. Contrary to the 
‘conventional wisdom’ that security markets have to be developed in order to resolve agency issues based 
on expecting separation of ownership from control, these markets themselves were utilized as a specific 
tool for company ownership concentration. 
Threat of private controlling shareholders. In Bulgaria, the behaviour of privatisation funds after 
mass privatisation resembles both the behaviour of their Czech counterparts (well-known as ‘tunnelling’) 
and the behaviour of the board of directors and top-managers of corporatized enterprises in Bulgaria 
(simply looting) in the early transition. ‘Tunnelling’ includes transfer of company products (in corporatized 
firms) or both products and assets (in privatised firms) below their market price to private ‘crony’ firms, 
controlled by the same managers (or their relatives or ‘cronies’) which are in control of the original 
company. Sales and purchasing contracts are designed to go through these ‘crony’ firms, raking off profits 
from a given subsidiary.  
The experience of other countries (for example, Russia) has also shown similar patterns of 
privatised companies decapitalization and minority shareholders expropriation. Another example is the 
Slovenian experience after mass privatisation when large institutional investors emerged and issues how to 
constrain their discretionary behaviour were on the agenda (Bainbridge, 2000). It can be concluded that: 
first, mass privatisation led to company owners aiming to obtain control and becoming controlling 
shareholder to exploit minority shareholders (by self-dealing transactions, withholding dividends, etc.). But 
this gave rise to a totally different concept of ‘private owners’ not envisaged initially by the Washington 
Consensus policy. Second, even where mass privatisation outcomes were better (like in Poland till 1998) 
they were unstable and were due to state-created privatisation funds, highly constrained by regulation.  
The described failures have limited capital market development. Newly established private firms 
cannot raise new capital through the public sale of new equity. The lack of development of the secondary 
market for shares of privatised companies has led to lack of capital needed for their restructuring. Finally, 
diversifying risk through portfolio investment in domestic companies is difficult. Only concentrated 
ownership and investments under private and majority control can be viable under the Bulgarian conditions. 
Capital flight has become rational business behaviour because of the lack of viable investment 
opportunities in the country.          
 
F. Banking Sector Change 
 
In Bulgaria, a two-tier banking system was established, the first tier covering the Bulgarian 
National Bank (BNB) and the second tier the commercial banks. In the 1990s, the Bulgarian banking 
system development was characterized by a steady increase in private banks and foreign participation 
(Table 10). At the end of 2000 about 80% of bank assets were privatised and the foreign investors’ share of 
bank assets was 74%. The concentration in the banking system is high; the three largest banks (Bulbank, 
United Bulgarian Bank and DSK Bank) hold almost 50% of the total bank assets, incl. 36% of the total 
credits (Bulgarian National Bank, 2000). The present corporate investment finance is embarrassed by both 
fragile capital markets and the specific passive lending behaviour of Bulgarian banks. The share of the 
domestic credit of GDP decreased dramatically from 115% in 1996 to 18% at the end of 2000. This kind of 
bank behaviour can be explained by both the financial crisis in 1996 and conditions under currency board 
introduction since 1997. 
In the period 1989-96, before the currency board establishment in July 1997, banks-firms relations 
were integrated into the system of primitive accumulation of capital among ‘crony’ private firms and 
different interest groups (Koford and Tschoegl, 1999; Caporale et al., 2001). In 1989-92, the first stage of 
the banking system development began. In 1990, the regional branches of the Bulgarian National Bank 
were transformed into state-owned joint-stock companies. The official version was fostering of competition 
and decentralization, but in fact, a process of illegal and hidden privatisation of bank sector had begun. In 
1991, newly established private banks emerged. There was no new legislative framework for bank 
activities. The emerging web of communist – capitalists had used the institutional vacuum to decapitalize 
state-owned banks and transfer capital to establish new ‘private’ banks. Second, in 1992, two basic laws 
were adopted: the Law on the Bulgarian National Bank and the Law on Banks and Credit Activity. 
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Bank) and bankers led to a bulk of illegal bank operations.          
The typical utility function of both bank managers and ‘crony’ firms’ borrowers was credit 
maximization. The banking sector, like the real sector and the state, showed the same dual behaviour, 
typical of the Bulgarian transition. On the one hand, there was de facto unavailability of credits for the 
majority of private firms (independent ones). But on the other hand, there was a huge concentration of 
credits in a few ‘crony’ private firms (Table 11). Recent ad hoc investigation revealed that in 1989-97, 356 
‘bad’ credits (each over DEM 1 million) were lent to only 274 ‘crony’ agents. For 129 of these credits there 
was no collateral. The total sum was around DEM 2 billion (Trud newspaper, 14 January 2002). This gave 
rise to the bank crisis in 1996 and at the beginning of 1997, when 14 banks, whose balances accounted for 
25 % of the consolidated balance of the Bulgarian bank system, were closed (OECD,1999). 
The currency board, introduced in July 1997, established a new institutional framework of all 
economic agents, breaking off the inefficient links between the state and the banking sector, on the one 
hand, and the state and the central bank, on the other. Under currency board constraints the central bank 
cannot lend to the government, cannot refinance banks and has no monetary policy. Following the financial 
crisis in 1996-97 and more recently the accession talks and harmonization with the EU legislation, the law 
on the central bank was amended and improved and a new law on the commercial banking was adopted 
introducing efficient governance structures: consolidated supervision, stringent collateral requirements for 
large credits, increase of capital adequacy, etc.  However, banks are overcapitalised (about 34% capital 
adequacy in the whole system that is quite higher than the 8% international requirements) and have soft 
liquidity constraints. The typical bank lending behaviour to the domestic sector is very passive, interest rate 
spread (difference between deposits and credits interest) is high (10-12%). Under low domestic treasury 
bills supply (because of practically always balanced government budget), the Bulgarian  banks mainly 
invest abroad, especially in foreign banks deposits and foreign governments treasure bills. The bank assets 
abroad accounted for 2 billion EURO or 36 % of their assets (Bulgarian National Bank, 2000). However, 
the low banks credit activity hampers Bulgarian business and economic growth and under specific 
conditions could even undermine the Bulgarian currency board itself.  In the whole enterprise sector, 
internal financing has been the most frequently used source of finance up to now, used by 89 % of MEBOs 
and 75 % of foreign and local investor-owned companies; debt finance was used in 42 % and 45 % cases, 
respectively and equity finance was a less important source of finance (Manev et al., 2000). 
 
IV. Historical Experience of Developed Countries and Corporate Governance Design in Bulgaria 
 
In Bulgaria, the actual corporate governance design sharply contrasts with the historical 
experience of corporate governance design in developed countries like the U.S at the end of 19 century, and 
pre-war and post-war Japan. First, in Bulgaria, the driving force of the transition was the political class (a 
specific social hybrid that can be described as “former communists-present capitalists”), the approach to 
corporate governance design was “top-down”, based on non-transparent decisions of a small group of 
ruling people with rent-seeking behaviour. In a sharp contradiction to the Bulgarian political class based 
approach, in the US case, economic agents like investment bankers and investors were key actors designing 
new governance mechanisms in order to protect minority shareholders and company managers against a 
potential incoming hostile raider. This determined the “bottom-up” approach to corporate governance 
design with a very limited scope for political influence (Coffee, 2001). The Japanese experience shows that 
company managers, commercial banks and government (especially the Ministry of Finance) played a 
crucial role. That resembles a mixture of both the “bottom-up” approach observed in the American case and 
the “top-down” approach to transformation in transition economies like Bulgaria. Second, in Bulgaria, 
international institutions (IMF, World Bank, EU) and Western advisors were the main initiators of 
legislation transplantation, while in the U.S. legal changes can be seen as a result of lobbying forces efforts 
(coalitions including investment bankers and investors as well), stock market speculations and scandals 
were frequently a trigger to a legal reform. In the American case, the design of efficient corporate 
governance structures was based on private ordering and self-regulation (not on laws). Third, in both Japan 
and the U.S., private investors and companies have had a long-term track while in Bulgaria they have to be 
established. The Bulgarian managers of state-owned firms have never had the incentives of their private 
counterparts in the U.S. and the Bulgarian state agency for privatisation has never had the reputational 
capital needed in order to attract investors. In the Bulgarian case, there has been a simultaneous process of 
both capitalist corporate governance system establishment and primitive accumulation of capital. Fourth, 
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was a driving force for the development of the countries. However, in Bulgaria, there has emerged an 
internationalist ruling class motivated by values of a liberal international economic order.  
Table 12 presents a historical focus on corporate governance mechanisms designed in Bulgaria 
and developed market economies. In Bulgaria, despite formal policy adherence to Anglo-American 
corporate governance, there is a striking difference between corporate governance design and the American 
historical experience. First, mechanisms for  protection of minority shareholders are not developed in 
Bulgaria and also in Japan after the war. In salient contrast, these governance mechanisms were key 
elements in the early American stage of corporate governance design. Second, the board of directors as a 
governance device has been implemented in all the three countries. However, in the case of Bulgaria, this 
mechanism was not enough to constrain managerial opportunism and even worse, this mechanism was used 
as a specific institution not for development but rather decapitalization and assets stripping of state-owned 
enterprises. In the case of Japan, the board of directors’ functions have been reshaped by implicit social 
norms stressing not on monitoring but on employee representation. Third, implicit governance rules are 
important institutions in both Bulgaria and Japan while in the American case they have had limited 
influence.  
 
V. ‘Catching-Up’ Stage of Development and Corporate Governance in Bulgaria 
 
The Bulgarian economy ten years later (like at the beginning of transition) was at a stage requiring 
to ‘catch-up’ with other advanced EU market economies (Table 13). In 2000, the Bulgarian GDP per capita 
was 24% of EU average. Some forecasts envisage that in 2015 Bulgaria will have 32% of EU average per 
capita assuming 4% annual GDP growth (WIIW, 2001). Such kind of intellectual exercises are very risky 
(imagine who expected the communist collapse 15 years ago), nevertheless they focus our attention on the 
actual issues, the backwardness of the Bulgarian economy and the high-rate growth need. Rapid 
accumulation of large quantities of cheap capital is crucial to support the catching-up growth and different 
corporate governance systems can be used. For this purpose neither corporatization and privatisation, nor 
the private sector development are foremost tasks, but rather a policy for promoting a high saving rate and 
financing business expansion (Taylor, 1992; Morck, Yeung, 2001). However, the real results of the 
Bulgarian transition in the 1990s were totally different (Table 14). The gross savings and gross fixed 
capital formation as a share of GDP declined in the 1990s and reached 10%, respectively 16%, in 2000. 
The domestic credit sharply fell from 119% in 1991, and 115% in 1996 to 18% of GDP in 2000. The 
analysis in the previous sections definitely shows that the banking sector and capital markets were not 
efficient devices for business finance. The striking outcome of the transition policy in Bulgaria ten years 
later was the dependence of the Bulgarian economy on external financial sources (FDI, loans, etc.). Some 
policy lessons about ‘catching-up’ factors could be drawn from both the Bulgarian communist ‘catching-
up’ experience after the Second World War and the Washington Consensus based primitive accumulation 
of capital in the early 1990s.                      
 
A. ‘Catching-up’ under Communism after World War II  
 
After the Second World War Bulgaria carried out a specific ‘catching up’ policy under the Soviet 
Union occupation forces impact. First, accumulation and centralization of capital was achieved by forcible 
industrial nationalization and land cooperation under the communist revolutionary slogan: ‘Expropriation 
of expropriators’. The basic importer of new technologies was the Soviet Union. Second, the key 
institutions for ‘catching up’ were the emerging ‘socialist’ public ownership and totalitarian state. The 
change of ownership from private hands to ‘more progressive’ public ownership was the most important 
driving idea at the beginning of ‘communism building’. This obsession was the key difference between the 
communist type of post-war ‘catching up’ growth and East Asian models. Third, financial institutions were 
nationalized too, and the central plan and different totalitarian state institutions emerged. Fourth, however, 
despite the strong capital control constraints the general utility functions of the emerging communist party 
elite were not oriented to the national development but rather to Moscow directives.
25  
                                                 
25  There was a forcible adverse social selection in the early years of communism. During the first months of 
‘communist freedom’ in 1944 tens of thousands of Bulgarian intellectuals, bankers, priests, journalists, teachers, 
craftsmen, peasants, etc., belonging to the economic, political, intellectual and cultural elite of the nation, were killed 
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tool of accumulation of capital; (ii) hypertrophied public ownership and overestimation of ownership 
change per se; (iii) emerging totalitarian state institutions, and (iv) a new pro-Soviet communist elite. The 
emerging totalitarian institutions were suitable to complete the accumulation and centralization of capital 
but were not capable of establishing efficient management and governance structures. In the early 1960s in 
Bulgaria, a need to improve the existing governance structures arose (for analysis of corporate governance 
reforms in the 60s and 80s, see Peev,1995). The entrenchment of top communist nomenclature leaders and 
the nature of the totalitarian state terror can explain why only the natural generation change in the Soviet 
Union in the 80s did manage to trigger reforms leading to the communist collapse.   
 
B. ‘Catching-up’ under Washington Consensus Based Transition (1990-1996)  
 
In the early transition period, ‘catching-up’ with the developed market world was based on a 
policy deserving the name ‘vulgar Marxism and vulgar Coase-ism’ (as Janos Kornai stated in a recent 
article, Kornai,2001). The transition to a market economy in Bulgaria resembles the early post-war years of 
‘communist building’. It seems that the approach remained the same, only the direction of ownership 
change was different. First, in the early 90s, the basic source of capital accumulation of the domestic 
private sector (newly established firms and privatised ones) was the state sector. However, this capital was 
not directed to absorb technological knowledge from outside but rather to ‘escape’ from the country. 
Second, there were no institutions for ‘catching up’. Private initiative should have played the main role. The 
state withdrew its activities from the economic life and the bank system was weak and orientated to state 
assets re-distribution and looting. Third, a salient feature of this type of ‘transition’ was capital flight. New 
political ruling class (mostly from former communist nomenclature) has preserved internationalist attitudes 
under the new post-communist conditions.  
The basic traits of the process described above were as follows: (i) overestimation of privatisation 
and private sector establishment and private initiative; (ii) preservation of political elite orientation to 
‘liberalization’ rather than national development; (iii) lack of policy prescriptions for absorbing the 
knowledge needed for ‘catching up’; (iv) lack of institutions designed for ‘catching up’. The post-
communist  creative destruction process was characterized by: a) destructing totalitarian state, public 
ownership, state control in state-owned firms, and state regulatory functions; b) creating new private 
owners but without a national strategy or policy for national development, absorption of knowledge and 
establishment of institutions for ‘catching-up’.  
 
C. ‘Catching-up’ since 1997  
 
During 1997-2001, a currency board arrangement, starting negotiations for EU membership and 
two new governments shaped a new framework of economic policy in Bulgaria. In fact, the most important 
positive event in the recent Bulgarian history since the beginning of transition was the decision of the 
European Council in Helsinki on 10-11 December 1999 to start accession talks with Bulgaria. As a result, 
Bulgaria significantly reformed and aligned its commercial legislation with the European Community legal 
framework. Recent surveys reveal that the Bulgarian commercial laws have been improved consistently 
and can be characterized as reasonably good for supporting investment and other commercial activities (see 
EBRD,2001; Peev, 2000). This has led to increased public confidence in the rule of law. The commercial 
law of Bulgaria is perceived as being at the same level as that of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovenia, Hungary, Croatia, and Romania. However, the legal reform introduced is merely a necessary 
condition for corporate governance development but not a sufficient one and there still exists a gap between 
law development and law implementation and enforcement. The positive tendencies observed for the so-
called ‘institutions building’ focusing attention on corporate governance issues are not a foremost task from 
                                                                                                                                                 
by Soviet collaborationists in Bulgaria. Under special Moskow orders politicians from different parties like Nikola 
Petkov (Bulgarian Agrarian Party), Trajcho Kostov (Bulgarian Communist Party), different right-wing leaders were 
executed through patched up lawsuits. The real goal of fighting against ‘capitalism’ in Bulgarian after the war was 
destroying the Bulgarian patriots and appointment of mediocre but loyal to the Soviet Union   puppets.                     
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accumulation of capital.  
   The new government elected after the general elections on 17 June 2001 has encountered specific 
difficulties regarding ‘catching-up’ to EU market economies. Theoretically, the efficient ‘catching-up’ 
policy in Bulgaria could be determined by the following cause-effect relationships: 1) establishment of 
coalitions oriented to national development (this is a crucial point); 2) consolidation of state institutions for 
a strategy for national development aiming at some key issues: (i) accumulation of psychical and human 
capital, including human capital development through education, learning, etc. (ii) development of 
institutions (including bank system) for accumulation of capital and enterprise finance, encouragement of 
the entrepreneurship; (iii) policy for technological capabilities development, including   technology and 
knowledge importation, active industrial policy for sectoral development; (iv) active government policy for 
fostering demand through public investments, controlling foreign trade, capital control in order to keep 
savings in the country, etc. However, the measures shown above are drawn from the historical experience 
of successful and non-successful ‘catching-up’ stories (see, for example, the Japanese experience from 
1867 to the post-war times, Odagiri and Goto (1996) . The real challenge before policy-makers in Bulgaria 
is how to adopt these lessons to globalisation constraints facing their policy at the beginning of the new 
century. 
First, in 2001-2002, the positive great expectations are connected with the emerging new coalition 
for collective action – a new prime-minister (the former Bulgarian King Simeon II), his ministers (former 
financial analysts in the London City) and their ties to the international financial world. Second, at the same 
time, however, country-specific globalisation factors, like IMF discretion in the Bulgarian internal affairs 
(based on the huge domestic external debt), EU enlargement policy requirements (based on the Bulgarian 
negotiations talks and policy for accession), also currency board arrangements have significantly 
constrained the potential Bulgarian ‘catching-up’ policy. The four key issues stated above encounter 
specific difficulties in Bulgaria.   
(i) After the wasted years of primitive accumulation of capital, state firms and banks 
decapitalization and of capital flight, the basic problem has been the scarcity of domestic capital. Foreign 
investment, foreign loans and proceedings from a new style of privatisation (a more transparent one) could 
be the main sources of capital. However, this has significantly decreased government discretion for an 
independent ‘catching-up’ policy.   
(ii) The prevailing foreign banks in Bulgaria (and requirements of international financial 
institutions for privatisation of the remaining state-owned banks) narrows the scope of government 
discretion for a more active national policy and establishment of a bank system in lines of Japanese and 
East Asian concentrated banking models. The currency board arrangement and the practical lack of 
monetary policy of the Bulgarian National Bank also decrease government discretion. The restrictive 
monetary policy under a currency board provided an increase in the monetary supply mainly by external 
sources: increase in net exports, increase in foreign investment in new private firms, revenues from 
privatisation, portfolio investments, loans from international financial institutions. The restrictive fiscal 
policy set the payments of the external debt as the first priority of the budget.  
 (iii) During transition years, despite some government programmes (Investment Programme for 
the period 1998-2001; Strategy for the development of Bulgarian high-tech industry in 1999; specific 
restructuring programmes applied for some sectors etc.), a prominent feature of the industrial policy has 
been its passivity and bureaucratic carelessness to real sectoral development. The new government has 
intended to carry out more active sectoral policy but the EU requirements for accession are restrictive in 
this field.      
(iv) Since 1997, the external trade was further liberalized. The current payment regime was also 
liberalized as in September 1998, the government assumed the obligations under item 8 of the Statute of the 
IMF. The currency regime led to further liberalization of the capital flows though with noticeable 
restriction to the export of capital from Bulgaria. At the same time, the inherited profitability of the 
Bulgarian economy was low, and many products were uncompetitive both in the domestic and foreign 
markets. Each attempt of the Bulgarian government against liberalization measures would run against IMF 
opposition.   
 
VI. Failures of Washington Consensus and Searching New Approaches 
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and Slovenia show that under certain circumstances some transition countries could perform better than the 
others. Apart from the different initial conditions and the historical background regarding the former 
Russian Empire and the geographical remoteness from Brussels, these countries have experienced specific 
policy approaches to corporate governance design that can be summarized in some points. Poland adopted a 
slow mass privatisation programme designed carefully by its government. Hungary preferred cash 
privatisation, privatising case-by-case state-owned enterprises and showing great transparency to the public. 
Estonia had a unique experience (deriving from the fight for freedom against the Russian occupation) 
introducing currency board at the very beginning of transition, adopting the German style of privatisation 
and inviting experts from the German agency for privatisation Treuhandanstalt  for advisors. In Slovenia, 
the government adopted a special strategy about which firms can be privatised and which not. The Eastern 
Germany privatisation approach is probably the most specific. In this case there was both FDI from the 
Western Germany and import of human capital (about one million specialists, lawyers, top-managers, 
professors,etc., including descendants of German entrepreneurs who had left East Germany after the World 
War II).  The experience of China shows that national development can be successful under a communist 
party ruling and when competition fostering is a more important task than privatisation. The picture 
observed is quite complicated but some lessons can be outlined. Better performance is typical of countries 
which: (i) preserve strong government commitment to privatisation policy (carefully designing privatisation 
strategies, national industrial structures priorities, etc.); (ii) import both financial and human capital; (iii) 
preserve their national development priorities against foreign influence.            
Comparing these developments with both the Washington Consensus prescriptions and the 
Bulgarian experience, one can see the striking difference. The government active involvement in corporate 
governance design, human capital development and even human capital import, and national development 
(but not just privatisation, stabilisation, liberalization) really matter.  
   The overview of the Washington Consensus policy failures themselves is not a subject of this 
study. However, without outlining some systematic policy flaws it would be impossible to understand the 
particular failures of the Washington Consensus in the field of corporate governance.  
Internal factors/external goals dichotomy. First of all, there was an intrinsic contradiction 
between the normative frame of reference of this policy (adherence to global normative objectives) and the 
explanatory frame (focusing mainly on national factors as contributing for a country performance). In this 
respect, Gore (1996) defines the basic explanatory method of this policy as “methodological nationalism” 
and states that: “Explanations which are methodologically nationalist try to explain economic and social 
trends in countries, basically by reference to facts about the countries themselves” (Gore,1996: 80). First, 
this approach overestimates the impact of internal factors and assumes that countries face the same external 
environment. Differences in their performance have been considered to be due to the internal factors. 
External shocks in transition (as for example former CMEA market collapse) are understood as changes of 
their general external environment and are to be common for all the transition countries. But these 
assumptions sharply contradict the transition reality: (i) the origins of transition are based on 
internationalist political elite coming to power in mid 80s; (ii) international financial institutions and 
developed countries have different interests and policies in different transition countries and “external” 
environment is not neutral. 
Second, this approach assumes national performance as a result of internal factors, especially 
domestic policy. National governments are taken to be like rational individuals with strategies and goals to 
pursue national interests. However, under a turbulent transition environment narrow political interests have 
been the actual driving force of unstable governments. In the case of Bulgaria, governments have had a low 
degree of discretion and external advisors have frequently reshaped the national policy based on the aid 
regime of the IMF and the World Bank. Access to donor funds has become conditional to the policy of 
‘structural adjustment’. 
Third, adherence to global normative objectives, principles and norms (economic liberalization) 
determine which policy is “rational”, “good” (as fast openness of economy) or “bad” (as selective active 
industrial policy). Here the key defect of this policy can be found. Its goal is not an efficient long-term 
country development based on specific national interests (despite magical slogans like “free market” and 
“structural adjustment”) but rather economic liberalization itself becomes both an objective and a means 
to transition.      
Failures in corporate governance design. The Washington Consensus policy approach to 
corporate governance transformation in transition countries is based on the presumption that the ownership 
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approach to ownership and control structures and their effects on firm performance, encounters difficulties 
to explain the real business behaviour in transition economies. Some of these explanatory analysis failures 
are presented below.  
(i) State versus market. The main dilemma of this policy is state or markets and the “right” answer 
is that the market rationality is superior to the state intervention. However, the real issue is not about state 
versus market rather the specific state and markets interactions promoting national development.        
(ii) Ownership and performance. First, the main issue is whether relationship between ownership 
structure and performance under transition conditions can be interpreted as causal. Firms, which are 
selected for privatisation, are not selected randomly. There would be reverse causality from performance to 
privatisation. The differences in privatisation rules across regions and countries can determine foreign 
ownership structure and insiders-outsiders control structures in general. Second, state sector - private 
sector dichotomy. The typical relationships between private firms established de novo and state owned 
enterprises are rather between victim and vampire than between equal economic agents. Third, privatised 
firms – state-owned firms’ dichotomy. Some private owners are as inefficient as the former state owner 
after privatisation. By definition privatisation is a political process directed to efficient reallocation of 
resources. However, in many cases the privatisation process only leads to national wealth re-distribution. 
Many privatised firms are run by kleptocrats with aiming actually at plundering the firms’ assets and to 
transfer money abroad. Privatisation is misleading concept. The real economic phenomenon is wealth re-
distribution with random consequences about efficient firm performance.  
(iii) Insiders control – outsiders control’ dichotomy. The distinctions made between insiders and 
outsiders have rather artificial nature in a transitional context. Insiders and outsiders are usually described 
as groups with distinctive interests. But in fact, within these groups there are significant differences - 
between young and old workers, between top and other managers. Besides, there exist wheels within 
wheels type of interests of the top managers and outsiders that are informal and frequently mean evading 
the law. Therefore, they are difficult to detect. By definition enterprises privatised by MEBO scheme are 
under insiders control. In fact, the finance sources for privatisation belong to groups of interest outside the 
enterprise. Managers are only their ‘post boxes’ and ‘puppets’. The real control is held by outsiders.  
(iv) Transitional institutions with transitional functions. New established private and state banks, 
corporatized state-owned companies, board of directors are new institutions that should have aimed at 
increasing either competition or managerial incentives for restructuring. However, these new so-called 
‘market’ institutions were designed and simply used for state-enterprises decapitalization. Conventional 
market economy terminology leads to misunderstanding of emerging post-communist 'crony' relations.  
(v) Reallocation and restructuring. The basic observed facts of ownership evolution are rather 
prolonged state enterprises decapitalization than exit. There are two types of private firms established de 
novo, independent ones and 'crony' firms with close political connections. In fact, the process of 
reallocation is characterized by primitive accumulation of capital from state firms to private ones. 
Important stages of state enterprises restructuring and ownership evolution are: 1) decapitalization; 2) 
primary privatisation; 3) resale and secondary privatisation; 4) restructuring, exit or nationalization. After 
primitive accumulation of capital, private firms have met two options in middle term, either to restructure 
or to exit.  
Finally, as regards the Washington Consensus policy normative evaluation failures, “crony” 
capitalist motivation for domestic state firms decapitalization and capital flight can be understood from 
international liberalization norms viewpoint as a “rational” and even “good” market-oriented corporate 
culture (to invest in developed financial markets than to fragile domestic ones). However, from the point of 
view of the national development and national interest this behaviour has led to a national disaster.    
About ten years after the beginning of transition, searching new policy ideas, lessons and 
theoretical approaches has become the actual agenda of corporate governance in transition. The recent 
financial crises (East Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998) have had significant effects on the search for new 
policy ideas and propositions for both transition countries and developing countries corporate governance 
design. Josef Stiglitz argues that a “post-Washington Consensus” policy has to be developed. The new 
approach should focus on: (i) institution building, (ii) human capital and sustainable long-term democratic 
development, (iii) people participation and consensus-building as the driving force for change (Stiglitz, 
1998). This approach preserves the principles of open economy and competitive markets. Key tasks are 
establishment of an efficient system of corporate governance and corporate finance, capital markets, and 
financial sector development.  
  30 
VII. Concluding Notes  
 
The key lesson from the Bulgarian transition story in the 1990s is that the unhistorical approach to 
corporate governance design in transition does not work. The basic traits of this approach are as follows: (i) 
the historical experience of corporate governance design in developed countries does not matter 
(underestimating the spirit of nationalism as a driving force for national development; (ii) the ‘catching-up’ 
policy of developing countries does not matter (underestimating the role of the state); (iii) the historical 
experience of countries ‘building communism’ after the Second World War does not matter 
(underestimating the initial transition conditions in the early 1990s).  
The emerging corporate governance system in Bulgaria has been neither Anglo-American 
(market-based) nor bank-based. The transition outcome has been rather ‘crony’ relationship-based 
corporate governance system. The striking features of this system are as follows: (i) a dual enterprise sector, 
(ii) ownership heterogeneity; (iii) fragile capital markets; (iv) pervasive bank lending behaviour; (v) 
globalisation factors discretion. 
Some specific outcomes of the study are as follows.  
First, as regards the Washington Consensus, corporate governance design in Bulgaria in the early 
transition was partly based on policy prescriptions by Western and American advisers and directed to 
convergence to market economy models of corporate governance but these prescriptions themselves: (i) 
contravened the American historical experience in designing corporate governance; (ii) contravened the 
historical experience of successful non-communist countries in ‘catching-up’; (iii) resembled the Bulgarian 
communist property-rights transformation after World War II. The basic traits of the Washington 
Consensus policy in the 1990s were as follows: (i) overestimation of privatisation and private sector 
establishment and private initiative; (ii) preserving of political elite orientation for ‘liberalization’ rather 
than national development; (iii) lack of policy prescriptions for absorbing of the knowledge needed for 
‘catching up’; (iv) lack of institutions designed for ‘catching up’. The post-communist creative destruction 
process was characterized by: a) destructing totalitarian state, public ownership, state control in state-
owned firms, and state regulatory functions; b) creating new private owners but without national strategy 
and policy for national development, absorbing of knowledge and establishment of institutions for 
‘catching-up’.  
Second, concerning primitive accumulation of capital, in the early transition years in Bulgaria, the 
‘internal contradiction’ (Mansur Olson) of the enormous power of parasitic forces for collective action (the 
emerging communist-capitalist web of former top communist nomenklatura, totalitarian secret services, 
etc.) was observed. These forces were expected to design efficient corporate governance system (ownership, 
control, legal and regulation environment) and simultaneously to preserve the status quo, their power. This 
created the dual character of corporate governance design in transition: (i) corporatization should have been 
a process of transformation of socialist state enterprises in order to establish more efficient governance 
structures but de facto it was a corporate governance change for state-owned companies looting; (ii) 
privatisation should have been a transfer of state assets to private firms to enhance allocative efficiency but 
in fact it was designed to loot state assets or to transfer them to  ‘crony’ private firms; (iii) the new private 
sector established both independent private firms and also ‘crony’ private firms aimed at state assets 
expropriation; (iv) the legal system and law enforcement should have been designed to constrain insiders 
and the totalitarian state and to defend creditors and shareholders, but de facto they led to weak, captured 
state and strong captors and ‘crony’ firms. Capital flight was an essential part of this process due to 
internationalist attitudes of the communist-capitalist web and property-rights uncertainty.  
Third, regarding ‘catching-up’ accumulation of capital, the efficient ‘catching-up’ policy in 
Bulgaria could be determined by the following cause-effect relationships: 1) establishment of coalitions 
oriented to national development (this is a crucial point); 2) consolidation of state institutions for a strategy 
for national development aiming at some key issues: (i) accumulation of psychical and human capital, 
including human capital development through education, learning, etc. (ii) development of institutions 
(including bank system) for accumulation of capital and enterprise finance, encouragement of the 
entrepreneurship; (iii) policy for technological capabilities development, including   technology and 
knowledge importation, active industrial policy for sectoral development; (iv) active government policy for 
fostering demand through public investments, controlling foreign trade, capital control in order to keep 
savings in the country, etc. The challenge before policy-makers in Bulgaria is how to adopt this policy to 
globalisation constraints decreasing government discretion, namely: a) servicing  of the external debt as the 
  31first priority of the budget under restrictive fiscal policy; dependence on foreign investment, foreign loans 
and proceedings from privatisation as the main sources of capital; (b) prevailing foreign banks in Bulgaria; 
(c) dependence on external sources for the monetary supply under a currency board: increase in net exports, 
increase in foreign investment in new private firms, revenues from privatisation, portfolio investments, 
loans from international financial institutions; (d) EU requirements for accession, especially restrictive 
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  35 Table 1. The Transition Recession 
Countries Consecutive  years
of output decline 
Cumulative output 
Decline 
Real GDP, 2000 
(1990=100) 
CSB* 3.8  22.6  106.5 
Albania 3  33  110 
Bulgaria 4  16  81 
Croatia 4  36  87 
Czech Republic  3  12  99 
Estonia 5  35  85 
Hungary 4  15  109 
Latvia 6  51  61 
Lithuania 5  44  67 
Poland 2  6  112 
Romania 3  21  144 
Slovak Republic  4  23  82 
Slovenia 3  14  105 
CIS* 6.5  50.5  62.7 
Armenia 4  63  67 
Azerbaijan 6  60  55 
Belarus 6  35  88 
Georgia 5  78  29 
Kazakhstan 6  41  90 
Kyrgyz Republic  6  50  66 
Moldova 7  63  35 
Russian Federation  7  40  64 
Tajikistan 7  50  48 
Turkmenistan 8  48  76 
Ukraine 10  59  43 
Uzbekistan 6  18  95 
Output decline during the  
Great Depression, 1930-34 
France 3  11  n.a. 
Germany 3  16  n.a. 
United Kingdom  2  6  n.a. 
United States  4  27  n.a. 
 
n.a. Not applicable 
* CSB – Central and Southeastern Europe and the Baltics, CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States. 
Simple average, except for the index of 1990 GDP, which shows population-weighted averages. 









  36Table 2.  Bulgarian Economy in the 1990s (some indicators) 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
GDP Growth  
(%) 
-11.7 -7.3  -1.5  1.8  2.1 -10.9  -6.9 3.5 2.4 
Inflation  
(CPI, end of period, %) 
473.9 79.6   63.2 
 
121.9 33.1 310.8  578.4 1.0  6.2 
Base Interest Rate  
(end of period, %) 
54.0 41.0 52.0 72.0 34.0 180.0  6.7 5.1  4.46
Foreign debt/GDP  
(%) 
168 127 109 129  73  243  91 72 78 
Private sector  
(share of GDP, %) 
  26.0 34.0 40.0 48.0 52.0 59.0 65.0 65.0
Privatisation 
(USD mn) 
   22,0  134,2  26,0 76,4 421,4 155,8 305.7
 


























  37Table 3. GDP of the ‘first-wave’, ‘second-wave’ transition countries and some other 
countries in 1999, USD billion   
                                             at current    Per capita,    Index, 
                                                          exchange rates    EU 15=100    1990=100 
A. Economies in transition 
‘First wave’ 
Czech  Republic    53.1    62    96.5 
Estonia     5.2    38    85.7 
Hungary       48.9      53                102.7 
Poland        154.7      42                 137.6 
Slovenia       19.6      73                 113.3 
‘Second wave’    
Bulgaria     1 2 . 0     2 4     7 4 . 9  
L a t v i a      6 . 3     2 9     5 7 . 8  
Lithuania    10.6    31    65.6 
Romania   34.0    28    79.6 
Slovak  Republic    18.8    49    104.2 
Other transition economics  
Croatia     20.1    33    82.3 
Macedonia    3.4    21    92.5 
U k r a i n e      3 0 . 8     1 6     4 0 . 8  
Russia     181.8    32    59.4 
B. EU and other developed industrial states 
EU-15     8511.0    100    117.8 
Greece     125.6        69    120.6 
Portugal     109.0        72    124.9 
Spain     595.2        80    122.4 
USA     9221.8    143    132.3 
Japan     4366.9    120    112.8 
Notes.’ First and second wave’ transition countries – division of the candidate countries for the EU 








  38Table 4.  Bulgarian Post-Communist Transition: Some Basic Stages 
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harmonization to EU 
Note. * Priority of utility functions of players in actual policy implementation. Index ranges from 1, 
indicating the first importance, to 3, indicating little importance. 







  39Table 5. Privatization in Bulgaria 
  1993   1994   1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  total 
  Percentage of the state assets that were privatised  
Cash 
Privatization  0.37 1.63  1.07  4.09 3.78 4.48 16.97 4.43  1.12 37.93 
Mass 
Privatization            14.58     14.58 
Total  0.37 1.63  1.07  4.09 18.36 4.48 16.97 4.43 1.12 52.51 
  Percentage of the state assets due to be privatised  
Cash 
Privatization  0.56 2.47  1.62  6.19 5.72 6.78 25.69 6.70  1.70 57.44 
Mass 
Privatization       22.08       22.08 
Total  0.56 2.47 1.62  6.19 27.8 6.78 25.69 6.70 1.70 79.52 
Source: Privatization Agency 
 
Table 6.  Consolidated Financial Indicators of the 20 Largest Holding Companies (ex-
privatisation funds) in Bulgaria 
   (thousand Bulgarian levs) 
  1998 1999 2000 
Assets  784 093  938 038  855 056 
Revenues  612 953  702 243  834 176 
Profits  40 490  -13 897  -3 991 
Long-term debt  47 688  59 256  97 893 
Short-term debt  113 252  162 886  194 774 
Source: State Securities Commission 
  
 
Table 7. Foreign Investments in Bulgaria (USD million)  
Year  Privatisation  Portfolio  Greenfield  Total per year 
1992     34 34 
1993  22 n.a. 80  80 
1994  134.2 n.a.  76  200.2 
1995  26 n.a.  136  162 
1996  76.4 n.a. 180  256.4 
1997  421.4 29.7  185 636.1 
1998  155.8 64.2  400  620 
1999  305.7 53.1  447 805.7 
TOTAL  1141.5 147  1538  2794.4 







  40Table 8. Post-Communist Countries Stock Exchanges: Overview 
 Turnover 
(USD mn ) 
Market Capitalization 
(USD mn ) 
Country 1998 1999  2000 1998  1999 2000 
Bulgaria  146.11 5.8  4.11  144.32  102.49 129.09 
Croatia  100.04 68.81  189.08 2928.58  2508.85  2742.43 
Czech 
Republic  4725.69 3933.79  6650.03 10430.79  10582.93  9746.16 
Estonia  690.99 280.39  305.86 519.39  1789.28  1812.76 
Hungary 16037.11  13454.57  12078.35 13791.36  16108.97 11908.44 
Latvia  88.65  43  272.69 385.01  390.87 563.31 
Lithuania 222.1 308.47  201.87  1074.12 1138.44  1587.65 
Romania  151.26 100.99  56.52  356.59  313.69 363.98 
Poland 8913.37  11139.37  19305.44 20461.09  29576.8  31428.61 
Slovak 
Republic  1012.02  478.03  533.93 650.48  459.97 436.18 
Slovenia 789.29  914.43  646.6  2984.94  2854 3099.65 
Source: Capital Press 
 
 
Table 9. Capital Markets in Bulgaria (1999)  




(Parallel   
market) 
C 









No.  of  listed 
Companies 
3 5  24  1  828  861 
Market 
capitalization 
in BGLev (mn) 
58  75  141    1 428  1 702 
Market 
capitalization 
in EUR (mn) 
29 38 72    868  1  008 
% GDP 
(GDP 22 780 
mn BGLev)   
0.25 0.33 0,62    6.3  7.47 
 
Source: See Bates and Cook (2000). 
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Table 10. Banking System in Bulgaria 
1990 1991  1992 1993  1994 1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
No. of banks 
 
70 53  56  37  42  44 45* 34  34  35 
No. of privately owned 
banks 
1 3  6 10 18 22  23  28  29 29 
Foreign Banks 
 
0 0  0  0  2  4  7  9 10 19 
Market share (assets) of 
largest banks (no. of 
banks in parenthesis) 


















* bank in liquidation are included   
Source:  BNB Annual Reports (see, Caparole, 2000) 
 
 
Table 11. Concentration of commercial credit to the private sector in Bulgaria, December 
1995 
Amount of loan (BGL’000s)  < 
100 











Share of credit (%)   0.00  0.03  0.08 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.49 
Share of number of loans 
(%) 
0.27  0.41  0.19 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.01 
Source: BNB Monthly Bulletin (Bulgarian edition), No. 6, 1996; OECD, 1997. 
 
 
Table 12. Corporate Governance Design: A Historical View to Anglo-American Model 
     Bulgaria* U.S.**    Japan*** 
Protection of minority shareholders: 
-  investment  bankers    no   yes   no 
- reputational capital pledge 
by  bankers  to  issuers    no   yes   no 
- stock exchange        fragile    yes         
-  disclosure  rules     no   yes   no 
Market for corporate control   no   yes   no 
Board of directors    yes   yes   yes 
Implicit norms as a basic mechanism  yes   no   yes 
Notes.     *   -  Bulgaria – in the early 1990s; 
**   -  US at the last quarter of 19
th century  
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Table 13. GDP per capita at current PPPs (ECU/EUR), from 2001 constant PPPs 
     1990   1994   1995   1996   1997   1998   1999   2000   2005   2010    2015 
 
Bulgaria     33   27       28       25       23       23       23       24       27       29        32 
 
Romania     36       30       32       33       31       28       27       27       29       32        35 
 
Hungary              49       46       46       46       48       49       51      53        59       65        72    
 
Russia                  57        36       34       33       33       30      31       33        37       40        45 
 
Germany            102     110     110     107     108     107    107      106     106      106     106 
 
Austria               109      111    110     112     111     112    112      112     112      112     112 
 
Greece                  60        65      66       66        66       66     67        68       68        68       68 
 
EU  (15)              100    100     100      100      100     100    100     100     100      100     100 
average 
Japan                 114    116     116      119      119     112    110     108     108      108     108 
 
USA                 148     148    144       147     150     152     153    156     156      156     156 
 
Source: The Transition Economies: Externally Conditioned Improvements in 2000, Slowdowns and 






Table 14.  Dynamics of Credits, Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Savings in Bulgaria 
(1991-2000) 
   1991 1992 1993 1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Domestic Credit (mn Bulgarian lev)  160.8 242 398 543.7 634.7  2011  5136  4227 4237   4654
         
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (mn BGlev)  24.64 32.6 38.7 72.33  134.3  238.5 1932 2496 3632 4111
         
Gross  Savings (mn Bulgarian lev)  24.8 25.1 17.7 36.5  95.95  148.8 2695 2494 2276 2530
         
Gross Domestic Product (mn Bulgarian lev)  135.7 201 299 525.6 880.3  1749 17103 21577 22672 25454
         
Domestic Credit/GDP   119% 121% 133% 103%  72%  115% 30% 20% 19% 18%
         
Gross Fixed Capital Formation/GDP   18% 16% 13% 14%  15% 14% 11% 12% 16% 16%
         
Gross  Savings/GDP   18% 12% 6% 7%  11%  9% 16% 12% 10% 10%
 
            
Source: IFS. 
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